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Abstract
This chapter examines the economics of property rights and property law.
Property law is a fundamental part of social organization and is also fundamen-
tal to the operation of the economy because it defines and protects the bundle of
rights that constitute property. Property law thereby creates incentives to protect
and invest in assets and establishes a legal framework within which market ex-
change of assets can take place. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the
economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of
property law and related extra-legal institutions. The chapter will both examine
the rationale for legal doctrine and the effects of legal doctrine regarding the ex-
ercise, enforcement, and transfer of rights. It will also examine various property
rights regimes including open access, private ownership, common property and
state property. The guiding questions are: How are property rights established?
What explains the variation in the types of property rights? What governs the use
and transfer of rights? And, how are property rights enforced?
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1.   Introduction
This chapter examines the economics of property rights and property law.  Property law is a
fundamental part of social organization and is also fundamental to the operation of the economy
because it defines and protects the bundle of rights that constitute property.  Property law thereby
creates incentives to protect and invest in assets and establishes a legal framework within which
market exchange of assets can take place.  The purpose of this chapter is to show how the
economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of property law and
related extra-legal institutions.   The chapter will both examine the rationale for legal doctrine
and the effects of legal doctrine. The guiding questions are:  How are property rights established?
What explains the variation in the types of property rights? What governs the use and transfer of
rights?  And, how are property rights enforced?
1.1. Property Rights and Property Law
Property rights have been a subject of discussion among philosophers as well as political and
legal scholars long before economists began to examine their origins and consequences.  We
define property rights as the ability (or expected ability) of an economic agent to use an asset
(Allen 1999, Barzel 1997, Shavell 2002). As Demsetz (1967) notes in one of the classic early
economic analyses, property rights are a social artifact that create incentives to efficiently use
assets, and to maintain and invest in assets.  They may or may not be enforced by courts and
because the actions of courts are costly, legal rights are but a subset of economic property rights.
In addition to law (and statutorily-based regulations enforced by administrative agencies),
property rights may be enforced by custom and norms (e.g., Ellickson 1991), and by markets
through repeated transactions.
Property law is the body of court enforced rules governing the establishment, use and
transfer of rights to land and those assets attached to it such as air, minerals, water, and wildlife.
Property law is thus a subset of the law governing property rights applied to land and related
assets.  Intellectual property law similarly details the conditions under which the courts enforce
rights to intellectual assets.  In this framework, virtually all, if not all, branches of law are
‘property rights law.’  Labor law defines the court’s role in enforcing rights to one’s labor;
contract law defines the rights of contracting parties, and so on.   Because the economics of
property rights originated with a focus on rights to land and associated natural resources (e.g.
fisheries, pastures, water) the link between “property law” and “property rights” is firmly
established.  This chapter will develop this link by examining property rights generally and
property law in particular.  Yet, much of the analysis in this chapter is applicable to topics
elsewhere in the handbook, though in many cases (e.g., contracts, torts) the literature has become
so specialized that the connection to the economics of property rights might seem faint.
The economic analysis of property law is substantially less well developed than the
economic analysis of contract law or tort law (for example, there is no generally applicable
model), and this chapter reflects this state of the discipline.  The economics of property rights,
however, is well developed but mostly without a focus on property law.1 The disconnection
between the economics of property rights and the law and economics of property law is
                                                          
1 The main exception to this is a deep theoretical literature on takings which is examined in section 8.
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longstanding.  Demsetz’ (1998) recent entry “Property Rights” in the The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics and the Law makes absolutely no mention of property law, and much
of the economics of property rights literature remains ignorant of property law.2  Similarly,
property law scholarship often is ignorant of economics. This is not to say there has not been
important work in property law with strong economic underpinnings (e.g., Ellickson 1993,
Epstein 1985, Heller 1998, Merrill 1986, Rose 1990), but it is clear that economics has not yet
penetrated property law as it has penetrated contract and tort law.  While it is common for
courses in contract law and tort law to be taught using economics as the guiding framework, an
economics based course in property law is almost unheard of.  In part, this chapter seeks to break
down this division by bringing the two literatures together.
1.2. Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and the Coase Theorem
The economics of property law begins with Coase (1960), who provides a property rights
perspective on the problem of externalities.3  Prior to Coase, economists viewed externalities as a
source of market failure requiring government intervention to force the responsible party to
curtail the harmful activity. Consider Coase’s famous example of the rancher and the farmer with
adjacent plots of land.  The rancher’s cattle stray onto the farmer’s land causing crop damage. If
the rancher’s profit, π(h), and the amount of crop damage, d(h), are functions of the rancher’s
herd size, h, then the first-best optimal herd size, h*,  maximizes π(h)−d(h).  That is, h* solves
π′(h)=d′(h).4  This is also the choice that would be made a single party were both the farmer and
the rancher, Coase’s ‘sole owner’ solution.    With separate parties, however, and the absence of
a contract between the farmer and the rancher or some type of government intervention (a tax,
fine, or regulation), the rancher would choose the herd size to maximize π(h).  This results in too
many cattle because the rancher adds cattle until π′(h)=0, which implies hr > h*.  Thus, the
rancher must pay a tax (or face liability) for the damage from straying cattle or he will expand
his herd beyond the efficient size.
Note that this solution to the externality problem embodies a particular assignment of property
rights--namely, that the farmer has the right to be free from crop damage.  Another way to say
this is that the farmer is labeled as the “cause” of the harm and therefore must face liability.  And
if the property right (or the legal liability rule) is structured properly, the rancher will purchase
the right to impose crop damage up to the point where the marginal profit from the last steer just
equals the marginal damage, yielding an efficient herd size.
Coase’s critique of this conventional, or “Pigovian,” perspective on externalities is not that it is
wrong, but that it is incomplete.5  To illustrate, suppose that the rancher initially has the
economic (and legal) right to impose crop damage without penalty.  According to the Pigovian
view, this would result in an excessive herd size because the rancher would expand the herd to
hr.  But note that the farmer would be willing to pay up to d′(h), his marginal damage, for each
steer that the farmer removes from the herd in order to avoid crop damage, while the rancher
would accept any amount greater than his marginal profit, π′(h). Thus, if transaction costs are
                                                          
2 Merrill and Smith (2001) note this also.
3 Another important, though little known early property rights contribution is that of Alchian (1965).
4 We assume that π″<0 and d″>0, ensuring a unique optimum.
5 This tradition is attributed to A.C. Pigou’s The Economics of Welfare (###).
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zero, the parties will contract too reduce the herd to the efficient size. In other words, the farmer
will purchase the rights to the straying cattle, the reverse of what happened under the Pigovian
solution.  The outcome in both cases, however, is efficient.  This conclusion has become known
as the Coase Theorem6, which can be stated in general terms as follows: When property rights
are well-defined and transaction costs are zero, the allocation of resources will be efficient
regardless of the initial assignment of property rights.
In reaching this conclusion, Coase challenged two assumptions implicit in the Pigovian view:
first, that there is a unique cause of the harm, and second, that government intervention is
necessary to internalize the externality. The Coase Theorem shows that neither is necessarily
true.  First, both ranching and farming are simultaneously causes of the harm--that is, causation
is “reciprocal” in the sense that if either party is removed, the harm disappears. 7 Second, if
private contracting is possible, a government-imposed remedy is not necessary to achieve an
efficient outcome.  The role of the government can be limited to assigning property rights and
enforcing whatever deals the parties make.8  These insights are important because they suggest
an expanded set of remedies for externalities as compared to the Pigovian taxation approach, a
point that we elaborate on below (see section 7).
The Coase Theorem is related to two standard results from welfare economics.  First, the claim
that parties to an externality will achieve an efficient allocation of resources through bargaining
is really just an extension of the neoclassical Invisible Hand Theorem to externality settings in
which transaction costs are zero. Initial assignment of property rights, like initial endowments of
wealth, is irrelevant for efficiency.  However, the initial assignment does matter for the final
distribution of wealth: clearly, the farmer is better off when he has the right to be free from crop
damage, while the rancher is better off when he has the right to impose damage.  This suggests
that, when the Coase Theorem holds, courts can achieve any desired distribution of wealth by
appropriately assigning rights, without sacrificing efficiency.9  In other words, there is no
necessary trade-off between equity and efficiency.  Of course, this conclusion mirrors the Second
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare economics, which says that any efficient allocation can be
achieved by suitable lump sum transfers of wealth (i.e., property rights).10
1.3. The Impact of Transaction Costs: When Does the Law Matter?
                                                          
6 Stigler (1987) takes credit for calling this proposition the “Coase Theorem.”  Stilger also recounts a famous dinner
at the home of Milton Friedman where Coase convinced a formidable groups of scholars (including Friedman and
Stigler) that his analysis was indeed correct.
7 In technical terms Coase points out that most interesting actions (Y) depend on the actions of both parties (a,b); that
is, Y = f(a,b).
8 Ellickson, in his study landowners and  the problem of straying cattle in rural California, found that such
contracting does occur, though the parties do not seem to rely on established legal rules as their starting point.
Rather, they proceed by “developing and enforcing adaptive norms of neighborliness that trump legal entitlements”
(Ellickson, 1991, p. 4).  In this context, at least, even a minimalist role for government seems unnecessary for the
Coase Theorem to hold.
9 Barzel (1997), however, argues that wealth effects are likely to be trivial and not a condition of the Coase
Theorem.  He notes that the standard example of rights shifting without compensation itself violates the assumption
of zero transaction costs since such a transfer would have to be compensated to meet this condition. [0]
10 Alternative assignments of property rights correspond to different initial endowments in the Edgeworth Box,
which, through exchange, lead to the contract curve.
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Although there has been debate among economists and legal scholars on the significance of the
Coase Theorem and its implications, Coase (1960, 1988) has been clear.  Economic and legal
institutions are important and have impacts because transaction costs are not zero and thus
property rights are not well defined (Allen 1999, Barzel 1997).  The Coase Theorem is merely an
analytical benchmark that puts the focus on property rights.    The Coasian approach thus stresses
the role of transaction costs in determining the allocation of resources and the role of institutions,
including law, in determining these allocations.11   Seen as the costs of defining and enforcing
property rights, transaction costs include enforcement costs, measurement costs, moral hazard
costs, and related costs (Allen 1998).
Not only will the law matter for efficiency, as Demsetz (1972) explicitly points out, but the law
itself is an economic choice, also expected to be driven by economic forces.12   Indeed, Coase’s
(1960) discussion of nuisance law suggests an economic logic to the law in its assignment of
property rights among various parties to these disputes.  Coase, then, is not only the fountainhead
for the economics of property rights but also for the economics of law.  Yet, Coase’s focus on
nuisance doctrine is a limited view of property law.  Nuisance and trespass law concern the
resolution of disputes that are not solved in the market, so here property law can be viewed as a
substitute for market allocation.13  The law of property, however, is much more that trespass and
nuisance; it is concerned with the establishment of property rights, the types of property rights
regimes that are allowed, and the rules that govern the use and transfer of property rights.  In this
sense, property law is a complement to markets.  If there is an overarching theme to the chapter,
this is it.
1.4.  Outline of Chapter
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a taxonomy of property
rights to illustrate the basic economic models.  Sections 3 examines the origin of rights.  Section
4 follows with an analysis of the changes in property rights, or what has become known as the
evolution of rights. Section 5 then examines various forms of voluntary exchange, including
markets, leases, and inheritance.  Section 6 examines involuntary transfers of title by adverse
possession and theft. Section 7 examines various means of internalizing externalities. Section 8
considers issues related to public (collective) ownership, as opposed to private ownership, of
property, including the optimal scale of ownership and takings. Finally Section 9 concludes.
Each section is a mix of formal and informal theory and application to law and related
institutions.  Throughout we try to make clear that the goal of the chapter is to use economics to
illuminate the rationale for and effects of property law doctrine.  Where possible we summarize
the empirical literature or explain empirical applications.  The sections are not symmetric
because the literature is not symmetric.
                                                          
11 Many scholars have called a case of zero transaction costs a “Coasian world” [get cites], but in making his case
that the real world is full of transaction costs, Coase (1988) claims “I am not a Coasian” [full cite].
12 In another pathbreaking article, Coase (1937) used a similar transaction cost argument to define the boundary
between markets and firms. Barzel and Kochin (1992) note the link between Coase’s property rights and transaction
costs theories.
13 But see section 7.4 where we argue that trespass law can be seen as promoting voluntary resolution of certain
property rights disputes.
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2. A Taxonomy of Property Rights
Since property rights predate property law it is appropriate to first examine the predominant
types of property rights regimes.  With this basic understanding, the economics of property law
can be pursued.  The economics of property rights began with Frank Knight’s (1924) analysis of
public and private roads.  Knight showed that a public road with no charge for access would be
overused compared to the private road because users would not face the full cost of their actions.
Gordon (1954) further developed Knight’s preliminary model – establishing the now famous
‘average product rule’ for input use -- in the context of an open ocean fishery where no one could
be excluded.14 Gordon’s model was completed with Cheung’s (1970) paper, which fully
characterized the Nash equilibrium for an open access resource.
Our analysis of various property rights regimes will use a common set of notation in which a
fixed asset (e.g., plot of land) is used in conjunction with a variable input (x) in order to produce
a market output (Y= f(x)).  If the input is available at a market wage of w, then the first-best use
of the input (x*(w)) must maximize R = f(x) – wx and satisfy the first-order necessary condition
f’(x) = w.   The first-best value of the land is thus 
0
* *( *, ) rtV R x t e dt
∞ −= ∫ , where r is the discount
rate.15  We start with open access, or a complete lack of property rights, and then, in turn,
examine private property rights, common property, and mixed property rights regimes.
2.1. Open Access
Assume there are n individuals who have unrestricted assess to a resource such as a piece of
land, and that output from the land (i.e., beef from grazing animals) is given by 
1
( )n
i i
Y f x== ∑
where xi is the effort of the ith individual, f’(⋅) > 0 and f’’(⋅) < 0, and the opportunity cost of effort
is the market wage, wi.16  Each person’s objective is to maximize his own rent subject to the
constraint of open access, which means that each user can only capture (and own) the output in
proportion to his share of effort.17  This means each person must solve the following constrained
maximization problem:
max ( )
i
i
i i i ix
R f x w x= −
(2.1)
subject to 
1 1
( )n ni i i ii if x x f x= = =  ∑ ∑
                                                          
14 Scott (1955) similarly shows the dissipation under open access and the private property solution.
15 Each period’s rent can be viewed as a steady state outcome.
16  This production function captures the effect of competing users of the open access asset and is standard in the
literature. Also, note that while ownership of the land is absent each person is assumed to have perfect ownership of
themselves and their labor.
17 This is a standard assumption but might be modified to explicitly distinguish use effort from violence effort.
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Assuming that all users are homogeneous18 (wi = wj, for all i ≠ j), the Nash open access
equilibrium is x = xoa(n, w1, …, wn), which must satisfy the first-order necessary condition
( ) ( )1 ,1
1
( )1 1 '( ) 1,..., .
n
nii
n i ii
ii
f xn f x w i nn nx
=
=
=
 − = = =   
∑ ∑∑                  (2.2)
Equation (2.2), as Cheung shows, is indeed identical to Gordon’s asserted average product
equilibrium, but only in the limiting case of an infinite number of users with unrestricted
access.19  Thus, in the limit as n→ ∞, (2.2) becomes
1
1
( )
,
n
ii
n
ii
f x
w
x
=
=
  =   
∑ ∑          (2.3)
which states that the open access equilibrium level of effort occurs where the average product
equals the wage.  More importantly, this limiting case also implies that rents are completely
dissipated; or that, 
1 1
( ) 0n n i oa oaii iR f x wx= =  = − = ∑ ∑  .   Similarly, the present value of the asset
is also zero; that is, 
0
( , ) 0.oa oa rtV R x t e dt
∞ −= =∫
In this framework, the absence of property rights leads to overuse of the asset and complete
dissipation of its value.20 Complete dissipation is a limiting result, however, of the assumption of
homogeneous users.  If users are heterogeneous, dissipation under open access will be
incomplete, and infra-marginal (low cost) users will earn rents (Libecap 1989).  The presence of
rent under open access may be an important factor in preventing the establishment of rights to
the open access resource because those earning rents will have incentives to maintain the open
access regime.
2.2 Private Property Rights
Private ownership, as Knight first noted is the straightforward solution to the open access
problem.21  Under the conditions of the Coase Theorem, the owner faces the full value and
opportunity cost of asset use, he chooses the first-best level of use (x* < xoa), and generates V* >
Voa =0.   The Coase Theorem also implies that, as long as property rights are well defined the
organization of the asset’s use will not matter: the owner may use the land himself, he may hire
inputs owned by others, input owners may hire (or rent) the asset, or there may be a sharing
arrangement between the asset owner and the input owners.
Not only does private ownership create incentives for optimal resource use, it also creates
incentives for optimal asset maintenance and investment.  With open access, no user has any
                                                          
18 This has been the starting point with Knight, Gordon and Cheung,
19 Equation (2.2) is actually a weighted average of average and marginal products.  Brooks et al. (1999) show that
Cheung’s(1970) equilibrium holds in a dynamic setting.
20 Hardin’s (1968) famously named “tragedy of the commons” is a popularized version of this literature.
21 This was well understood by Hobbs, Bentham, Locke and Blackstone long ago.
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incentive to use inputs that have a future payoff.22  To see the effect on investment, consider a
slightly modified version of the model above.23  Let future output be Yt+1 = f(xt),  where xt  is
current investment, available at a market wage of w, and the interest rate is r.  The first-best use
of the input ( *tx ) must maximize R = f(xt)/(1+r) – wtxt and satisfy the first-order necessary
condition f’(xt)/(1+r) = wt.  This outcome is generated under perfect private ownership.  Now let
π be the probability of expropriation (because of imperfect property rights) of the future output,
so that (1-π) is the probability the investor’s output remains intact. The solution to the investment
problem ( tx
π ) is now to maximize R = f(xt) [(1-π)/(1+r)] – wtxt which must satisfy f’(xt) [(1-
π)/(1+r)] = wt.  This clearly implies less investment ( *t tx xπ < ).   Pure open access means that no
investor could claim future output (π = 1), so oatx  = 0, and the rent from investment also equals
zero.
In a recent article, Heller (1998) identifies a situation in which a large number of uncoordinated
individuals have the right to exclude users, thus creating a regime in which assets are under-used
because each rights holder can exercise a ‘veto’ over use.  Because of the incentive to under use
rather than over use the asset, Heller labeled this the anti-commons and argues that many of the
development problems in post-communist Europe are plagued with this problem of ‘too many
owners.’  Buchanan and Yoon (2000) formalized Heller’s idea and gave it application in cases
where competing bureaucracies can stifle development by exercising veto rights.  De Soto’s
(2000) documentation of the difficulties of operating in an economy heavily laden with
overlapping bureaucracies is a similar application (as discussed in Section 5.1.2).  Anderson and
Lueck’s (1992) study of ‘fractionated’ownership of land on American Indian reservations is a
similar application. Anderson and Lueck found that divided ownership of agricultural land led to
dramatic reductions in the value of agricultural output.  While the anti-commons phenomenon
clearly is real, it can reasonably seen as an open access investment problem rather than as a
distinct regime.
The empirical literature on private property rights is of two types. First, there is a literature that
attempts to measure the dissipation from open access and compare resource use to that under
private property.  This literature is dominated by studies on natural resources and especially of
fisheries where open access regimes have been common (e.g., Agnello and Donnelly 1975,
Bottomly 1963).  These studies have estimated the deadweight losses from open access use and
compared levels of asset use in open access regimes with those of private property and other
limited access regimes.  Second, there is a recent and growing literature on the effects of
property rights security on resource use and investment.  Much of this literature has focused on
the investment effects of differences in legal title to land. In his survey article Besley (1998)
notes that the econometric evidence for positive investment effects in developing countries is
quite limited.  These limits arise from data limitations (on both measures of investment and
measures of property rights security) and from potential property rights endogeneity.  We expect
                                                          
22 Writing before Adam Smith, Wm. Blackstone (Book II, Chapter 1, 1765) recognized this and wrote:  “And the art
of agriculture, by a regular connexion and consequence, introduced and established the idea of a more permanent
property in the soil, than had hitherto been received and adopted. It was clear that the earth would not produce her
fruits in sufficient quantities, without the assistance of tillage: but who would be at the pains of tilling it, if another
might watch an opportunity to seize upon and enjoy the product of his industry, art, and labor?”
23 This is based on the detailed analysis of Bohn and Deacon (2000).
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more investment with better defined rights, but as we discuss in section 4, the choice of property
rights regime can itself be influenced by investment levels or other correlated variables.  Thus
the econometric issue is how to find an instrument for property rights variables to isolate the
effect of rights on investment.
2.3. Common Property Rights
In modern social science the term ‘commons’ or ‘common property’ originated in the analysis of
what is now called open access.  Yet, in law and custom common property has long meant, in
stark contrast to open access, exclusive ownership by a group.24  Common property regimes have
been well documented, especially for natural resource stocks in less developed economies
(Bailey 1992, McKay and Acheson 1987, Ostrom 1990), and their details have been studied in
many settings (e.g., Dahlman 1980, Eggertson 1992, Stevenson 1991). Many writers on common
property have noted the gains from group enforcement of rights to the resource (Ellickson 1993,
McKay and Acheson 1987, Ostrom 1990, and Stevenson 1991), and we model common
ownership to take this empirical feature into account.
Common property is best viewed as an intermediate case between open access and private
ownership.  Common property may arise out of explicit private contracting (e.g., unitized oil
reservoirs, groundwater districts) or out of custom (e.g., common pastures and forests); it may
have legal (e.g., riparian water rights) or regulatory (e.g., hunting and fishing regulations) bases
that have implicit contractual origins.  Contracting to form common property effectively creates
a group that has exclusive rights to the resource (Eggertsson 1992, Lueck 1994).  Acting together
individuals can realize economies of enforcing exclusive rights to the asset.  Equation (2.2)
implies that waste can be reduced simply by restricting access to the asset.
A contracting model can illustrate how common property can limit waste from the rule of
capture.25 Contracting to form common property effectively creates a group that has exclusive
rights to the resource.  We assume that (contractual) agreement among group members pertains
only to the group's size and the joint effort to exclude outsiders.  In this setting, individuals
acting together can realize economies of enforcing exclusive rights to the asset, so we also
assume the costs of excluding (or policing) non-members can be represented as p(n), where p'(n)
< 0 and p''(n) > 0.
A simple and customary method of allocating use of common property is a rule that grants equal
access to all members of the group (Ostrom 1990).  Equal sharing of the asset avoids the explicit
costs of measuring and enforcing individual effort (or use) but still creates an incentive for over
use.26  Effort is not explicitly part of the common property ‘contract’ so each member choose his
own effort (xi)  as he captures his share of the asset’s output (Y = f(x) again) in competition with
other group members.  The size of the group is chosen to maximize the wealth of the group
                                                          
24 Indeed Hardin’s (1968) famous paper incorrectly characterizes the common pastures of English villages as open
access resources when the historical record shows clearly that they were common property (e.g., Dahlman 1980,
Smith 2000).
25 The model is based on Lueck (1994).  Also see Caputo and Lueck (1994) and Wagner (1995).
26 Common property might also be viewed as an output sharing contract with moral hazard.  In this framework
group members shirks as in a principal-agent model (see Lueck 1994).  Empirical both types of common property –
asset sharing and output sharing – are found.
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subject to the constraint of aggregate effort (Xc) by members operating in a common property
regime, and in recognition of the costs of excluding outsiders.  Optimal group size is a tradeoff
between increased resource use with a larger group and increased enforcement costs associated
with a smaller group.  Formally the problem is
1 1
max ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )
cn n c
i ii iin
R f x n w x n p n= == − −∑ ∑ , (2.4)
where cix  is the individual’s solution to the problem in equation (2.1).  The optimal group size,
nc determines total effort27 and must satisfy the first-order necessary condition
( )( )1 1' '( ) 0.cn n ii ii i dxR f x w p nn dn= =∂  = − − =  ∂ ∑ ∑ (2.5)
Equation (2.5) states that the gain from an additional member in terms of a marginal reduction in
policing costs must equal the marginal reduction in aggregate rent from overuse of the resource.
The net present value of the common property resource is thus 
0
( , ) 0,c c rtV R x t e dt
∞ −= >∫ where
V* > Vc  > Voa = 0.  While the value of an asset governed by common property is less than its
first-best value, it could clearly have greater value than private property depending on the
magnitude of the policing cost and overuse effects.
Dissipation from internal capture can be limited by maintaining a homogeneous membership.
With equal sharing rules, a homogeneous membership maximizes the present value of a common
property resource (Lueck 1994, 1995).  Once a group chooses an equal sharing rule there is an
incentive to maintain homogeneity.  With heterogeneous members and equal shares, highly
productive individuals will supply too little effort and the less productive will supply too much,
so dissipation will increase.  In effect, equal-sharing rules increase group wealth with
homogeneity among group members.  This provides an economic rationale for preserving
homogeneity by screening potential members, by indoctrination, or by restricting the transfer of
memberships.
There are other potential limits on the capture behavior of individual common property owners
that are not considered by the above model.  For example, if group members expect to interact
over long periods the incentive to overuse the resource may be limited by the desire to maintain
the productive relationship. Accordingly, customary rules can evolve that restrict members, for
instance, by limiting the size of private herds on a common pasture (Rose 1986, Smith 2000).
For common resources that are attached to land such as oil, game, and water, ownership of the
land can limit access to the resource.  In effect, the group is the set of private landowners who
have access to the common resource.  In this case, private contracting to consolidate land
                                                          
27 Total effort is given by
1
cnc c
ii
X x==∑ .
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holdings is a possible solution to the ownership problem for the attached resource (Libecap and
Wiggins 1984, Lueck 1989).28
It is difficult to know how important common property regimes are in modern economies.
Certainly families and other ‘close knit’ groups use common property rights to govern resources.
The ‘lobster gangs’ of Maine are perhaps the most famous such case.  In modern businesses they
seem to be less typical, perhaps because group ownership leads to costly transfers of rights that
must ultimately be governed by political decision making.  It may also be true that large-scale
enforcement by the state (i.e., courts, police) has usurped the major advantage of common
property.  In law, riparian water rights and the public trust doctrine (as we show in Section 8.2.1
below) still contain important elements of a common property regime.
2.4. State Property Rights
A third, and increasingly important, category of property rights are those held by the state.
Governments (local, state and federal) own vast amounts of land, buildings, and capital
equipment.  Local governments own schools, road ways and fleets of police cars.  States own
vast tracts of land, especially in the west, where statehood grants established state trust lands to
be managed to finance schools. States own universities and administrative buildings. The federal
government owns over one-third of the total land area in the United States, again with a much
larger presence in the western states.  It owns the Outer Continental Shelf from the shore to the
200-mile international border and thus own billions of dollars worth of oil-gas and other
resources. The federal government also has vast holdings of urban real estate (e.g., The White
House, federal buildings throughout the country) and billions of dollars of capital equipment
ranging from fighter jets and aircraft carriers to personal computers and desks.
The specific set of property rights than govern these state assets varies widely and has not been
systematically analyzed by economists.29  All are under the control of some administrative
agency be it the US Army, the state highway department, or the Bureau of Land Management.
The statutes and regulations and political forces that govern these agencies varies widely and
thus lead to a range of outcomes.  Many federal lands are managed passively and are thus open
access for many uses, especially for outdoor recreation such as cycling, fishing, hiking, hunting,
and rafting.  This is true for the bulk of land administered by the Bureau of Land Management,
the Forest Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service.30  Other lands and uses are governed by a
combination of price and non-price (lottery, waiting lists) mechanisms, but open to virtually all
citizens in principle. Commercially valuable natural resources, such as coal, oil-gas, and timber,
are routinely leased to private firms, who essentially have private rights over certain attributes of
the land (Nelson 1995).  Ski resorts have long term leases to operate on federal lands, and
commercial businesses such as hotels tend to have similarly long term agreements to operate in
                                                          
28 On the other hand, there are problems when resource rights are tied to land ownership.  For example, further
parcelization of land can exacerbate the rule of capture as it has done with oil discovered in urban areas.  In addition,
linking rights can create incentives for further parcelization.  For instance, under riparian doctrine linking water to
land sometimes yields long, narrow "bowling alley" parcels designed to extend water rights to many users
(Dukeminier and Krier 2002).
29 Nelson (1995), however, notes the underlying and variable system of property rights in federal lands.
30 For these assets the typical rhetoric is that open access is good since ‘they belong to all of us’ yet no one would
make the same claim for an F-18 fighter jet.
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national parks.  Moveable property like desks, planes and rifles are governed differently as well.
In some cases state assets are assigned to individual users and thus become an almost exclusive
usufruct right.  It is well known that a soldier’s rifle is ‘his rifle’ and no one else’s. What seems
to be common to all of these regimes is a severe limit on transferability of rights.
Given the great variation in property rights, the analysis of state property not only requires a
detailed knowledge of the asset and the relevant administrative agency but also a workable
theory of bureaucracy.  The limited applicable literature is found in the analysis on natural
resource agencies, especially those governing federal lands.  An early study by Stroup and Baden
(1973) examined the behavior of the Forest Service and the management of national forests.
They pointed out the different incentives faced by Forest Service managers compared to those of
private forest owners and how interest groups influence agency behavior.  Since that time there
has developed a literature that has examined the economic efficiency of public land management,
mostly concluding that federal lands are not particularly well managed, and that these
inefficiencies often are coupled with lower environmental quality.
The relevant law for state property has origins in common law (e.g., mining on federal land in a
first possession rule) but is primarily governed by statutes and regulations, all shaped by
bureaucrats, interest groups and politicians.  These legal constraints shape the objective of
agencies.  For example, managers of state school trust lands in the west are typically mandated to
maximize financial returns and are used under a system of leases to private parties for uses
ranging from farming to hunting to logging.  National forests, however, are governed by federal
‘multiple use’ statutes which very often limit the ability of managers to generate revenue from
forest use.  These statutory constraints, in turn, shape the property rights that develop.
2.5.   Mixed property rights and complex assets
Real property regimes are more complex than the open access, private property, common
property, and state property discussions suggest.   Real property rights regimes, in fact, are
mixtures of these basic types.  A rancher’s land may seem to be private but this is only a partial
description.  The right to the grass for grazing is private but the streams running through the
property may be open access for fishing or recreation; or the grass may be a lease from a federal
agency with mineral rights held by yet another private party.  The underlying oil reservoir may
be governed by a unitization contract (subject to oversight by an state oil conservation agency)
among many neighboring ranchers, essentially mimicking common property. Predator control for
coyotes that roam across many ranches may likewise be governed by a common property regime.
Similar scenarios are found in residential and commercial real estate, and Bailey (1992) found a
mixture of ownership regimes among aboriginal peoples. This suggests a mixture of rights.
Because assets are a complex collection of valuable attributes, ownership is also a complex
collection of rights (Barzel 1982, 1997, Eggertssonn 1990, Ellickson 1993, Rose 1998),
comprised of the four fundamental types.
Little work has been done to understand the forces that determine the optimal complexity of
property rights.  This area thus remains an important area for future work. Smith’s (2000) study
of the common field system of medieval Europe is one of the few to examine the economic logic
of a mixed property regime.  Smith notes that for crops the land in the typical village was private,
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but that for grazing the land was common property.31   He notes how private property for crops
provides incentives for investment and husbandry and how a larger scale of land ownership is
optimal for grazing (of private herds). Lueck’s (1989) study of wildlife law focuses on the
variation in ownership of wildlife but recognizes that wildlife is but one of many valuable
attributes of the land and that the dominate property regime is linked to agricultural use.
Ellickson (1993) similarly notes a wide range of mixed regimes, including legal and customary
rights.  These studies are important in furthering our understanding of the complexity of rights
but are lacking a cohesive (and ultimately formalized) framework.  The modern principal-agent
literature on contracts, especially that on moral hazard, may be a starting point as our discussion
of land leases in Section 5 suggests.  The major question is to what extent each individual
attribute of asset can be treated as an independent asset whose ownership is independently
determined.
The common law of property begins with the ad coelum doctrine’s mandate that ownership of
land includes all attributes in an infinite projection above and below the earth’s surface.32  In this
system the only ownership question is the size of the surface boundaries.  The ad coelum
framework ultimately breaks down because various attributes (as the rancher example shows)
have different surface projections.  Thus the optimal ownership of land for a home may be one
acre, but for an oil reservoir it may be ten thousand acres and for an airshed it may be much
larger still.  The law has long recognized the limits of ad coelum doctrine and has developed to
accommodate the demand of different attributes of land.   The law of servitudes and the law of
separate estates in water and minerals are clear examples.  Modern public administration of
environmental resources are recent applications (e.g. Rose 1998).    The law of nuisance and
trespass, the focus of Coase’s analysis, has to do with conflicts that ultimately arise between the
owners of adjacent parcels, which derive from complex assets with various dimensions of use.
The doctrine of private necessity, for example, is an exception to the law of trespass, that
actually allows one to use another’s property in an emergency.33   Thus emerges the traditional
legal concept of property rights as a “bundle of sticks;” an idea that accurately meshes with the
complexity and mixed ownership of real assets.  As Ellickson (1993) notes, the common law
allows a wide variety of subdivision of rights in time, use, space.
3. The Origin of Property Rights
This section examines the origin of property rights.  In both custom and law first possession has
been the dominant method of establishing rights, and the rationale for and the effects of this
mechanism will be examined closely.  It will be clear that the manner by which possession is
defined and enforced will be crucial in the type of rights that are created.  Alternatives to first
possession are also examined including auctions, lotteries, and administrative assignments.
3.1.  First Possession
                                                          
31 Smith labels this regime a “semi-commons.”
32  The complete Latin phrase is "cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum," which translates "to whomsoever the soil
belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths" (Dukeminier and Krier 2002, p.141).
33 Ploof v. Putnam 81 Vt. 471, 71 A 188 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1908).  Here a person was allowed to tie-
down a boat at a private dock during a severe storm without permission. The court ordered the user to pay for the
use of the asset.
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First possession rules can operate on different margins.  For instance, the rule can grant
ownership of a single bison to the first person that kills it under the so-called rule of capture, or it
can grant ownership of the entire herd to the first person that claims ownership of the entire
living herd.  The behavior of the possessor and the use of the bison resource will obviously differ
in the two cases.  In the initial case, first possession applies to the flow of output from the stock
of living bison, while in the second case the rule applies to the stock itself.  In the bison example,
the rule of capture is expected to emerge --and in fact did -- because the cost of enforcing
possession to the live herd is prohibitive (Lueck 2002).
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of a first possession rule, beginning with an unowned asset.  As
the left branch of the figure shows, if applied to a stock, private property rights are established
directly through possession.  On the right branch, if only a flow (or a portion of the stock) can be
possessed, the rule of capture ensues.  Thus both paths have the potential for dissipation, either
from a race to claim the stock or from open access exploitation.  In a race, dissipation takes the
form of excessive investment prior to ownership, but the resource is unaltered.  In contrast, under
the rule of capture, dissipation manifests as damage to the resource from excessive use. The
stock-flow distinction also illuminates the temporal dimensions of ownership.  First possession
rules often vary as to the duration of the granted ownership right.  For example, possession could
grant ownership of a pasture in perpetuity or it could simply grant ownership of the grass
currently being grazed by one's livestock.  Perpetual ownership means ownership of the stock,
while a shorter term of ownership means ownership of some flows.  Granting rights to stocks
also confers ownership to the future stream of flows, so the formal economic model is inter-
temporal.  Granting rights to flows, on the other hand, means ownership is a one-time event, so
the formal economic model examines just one period.34
[Figure 1 here]
Consider an asset (e.g., a plot of land) that yields an instantaneous (net) flow of benefits R(x(t)),
where x(t) is the amount of a variable input supplied by private owners at time t.35  Let r be the
interest rate, and assume the flow value, R(t), grows over time at the continuous rate g < r, so
that the value of the asset grows over time.  Also assume that each period's return is independent
of past returns.36 The term g can be thought to measure increases in the demand for the asset,
perhaps because of population growth.  This formulation also recognizes the usual case that
during early periods assets are not sufficiently valuable to cover the costs of establishing
ownership.  The first-best, full-information outcome is
* ( )
0
( ( )) ,FB r g t
t
V R x t e dt
∞
− −
=
= ∫ (3.1)
                                                          
34 Of course, there can be ownership rights of intermediate term (e.g., patents, copyrights) but this simple
dichotomy covers most of the important cases and serves to clarify the model.
35 The model here is derived from Lueck (1995, 1998).
36 One can think of R(t) as the steady-state flow of benefits.  Note, if g ∃ r the present value of the asset
would be infinity.
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where x*(t) is the optimal input level in period t.  In general, VFB is not attainable because of the
costs of both establishing and enforcing rights that efficiently allocate use of the resource.
3.2. Claiming the Asset
The left-hand side of Figure 1 shows the case when ownership of the asset is granted to the first
person to obtain possession of the entire stock.  To simplify, we assume that the method of
possession does not damage other resources.  The first claimant thus obtains exclusive rights,
into the indefinite future, to the flow of rents,
0
*( )R t dt
∞∫ , generated by the asset.  Since
establishing a bona fide claim will be costly and because g < r, rights may not be worth
enforcing.  Under these conditions, property rights to the asset will emerge, after an initial period
without ownership, as the value of the asset increases (Demsetz 1967). Maximizing resource
value is, in effect, a problem of optimally timing the establishment of rights under first
possession.
Now assume there are one-time costs, C, of establishing enforceable rights or demonstrating
possession which grant the owner the exclusive right to the stream of production for all time.  If
there is a single potential claimant, the flow from the asset (and the rents) is available after rights
to the stock are established.  The decision to claim the stock is the result of private maximization
which, in this case, means the net present value of the asset is
* ( )[ ( ( )) ] ,
S
s
S r g t rt
t
V R x t e dt Ce
∞
− − −= −∫ (3.2)
where t* is the time at which ownership of the stock (and the flow of output) is established  under
first possession.  The optimal time to establish ownership is when the marginal return from
waiting, the present value of the asset's flow at t*, equals the marginal cost of waiting, the present
value of the opportunity cost of establishing rights also at t*, or   * ( ) .
S Sr g t rtR e rCe− − −=   Inspection
of (3.1) and (3.2) shows that the value of the asset clearly falls short of first-best, or V* < VFB.
This is because the net value of the asset must now account for the costs of establishing
ownership, and the fact that these costs delay ownership and production to t* from t = 0.
A first possession rule can dissipate value when there is unconstrained competition among many
potential claimants.37  In the simplest case with homogeneous competitors, potential claimants
gain ownership by establishing possession just before their competitors.  A claim is worth
staking as long as the net value of the asset is positive, so a competitive rush to claim rights
causes ownership to be established at exactly the time, tR, when the present value of the rental
flow at tR equals the present value of the entire costs of establishing ownership at tR, or when
( )* .
Rr g t rtRR e Ce− − −=    In such a race, rights are established prematurely at tR, where tR < t*.38
More important, the race equilibrium implies that the rental stream is fully dissipated; that is,
                                                          
37 This phenomenon was first studied by Barzel (1968) in the context of research and technological development.
Also see Mortensen (1982).
38 The single claimant solution yields t* = (lnr+lnC-lnR)/g while the race model gives  tR = (ln(r-g)+lnC-lnR)/g.
Inspection reveals tR < t*.
Lueck & Miceli – Property Law
15
* ( )[ ( ( )) ] 0.
R
R
R r g t rt
t
V R x t e dt Ce
∞
− − −= − =∫ (3.2)
Heterogeneity among potential claimants can reduce, or even eliminate, the dissipation of wealth
(Barzel 1994, Lueck 1995).  Assume there are just two competitors (i and j) for ownership of the
asset with possession costs Ci < Cj.   Also assume that neither party knows each other’s costs.  In
a race, person i gains ownership just before the closest competitor makes a claim, at time, ti = tR -
ε, and earns rent equal to the present discounted value of his cost advantage, iRV .   The key
implication is that as the heterogeneity of claimants (Cj − Ci) increases, the level of dissipation
will decrease.  The analysis remains the same with rental value differentials such as Ri ≠ Rj or
different expectations about the rate of growth of the flow value, gi ≠ gj.   In the extreme case,
where just one person has costs less than the net present value of the asset's flows, the first-best
outcome is achieved.  Since only one person enters the race, there is no dissipation.
Altering the assumption about information can alter the racing equilibrium.  Fudenberg et al.
(1983) and Harris and Vickers (1985) show that if competitors have complete information about
each other's talents a race will not ensue because only the low-cost individual will have a
positive expected payoff of entering the race; that is, VS is achieved if Ci < Cj,  i ≠ j = 1, ... n.
Even though claimant heterogeneity can limit or eliminate racing dissipation, there arises the
possibility that a claimant can gain a cost advantage by expending resources, thereby altering the
margins of dissipation (McFetridge and Smith 1980).  For example, if competing claimants can
acquire the technology to achieve the minimum costs (Ci), then homogeneity and the full
dissipation equilibrium is re-established.  This extreme result, however, relies on the assumption
that homogeneity can be attained easily by investing in the low cost claimant's technology.  The
more likely reality is that claiming costs depend not only on endogenous investment decisions
but also on exogenous forces that generate and preserve heterogeneity.  Consider two
possibilities.  First, if the distribution of talent across individuals is not equal, some people will
have innate advantages that will be difficult or impossible, to overcome with investment.
Second, if there is random variability in opportunities, then some individuals will be in the
position of being the low cost claimant; again, investment is unlikely to destroy the random
advantage.
Because first possession is a rule that restricts competition to a time dimension, there is another
reason why investment cannot routinely eliminate heterogeneity.  Cost advantages, no matter
how they were gained initially, are expected to diminish over time because potential investors
ultimately will gain information that allows them to mimic the behavior of the low cost person
(Kitch 1977, Suen 1989).  As long as costs depend on exogenous factors, dissipation will be
incomplete.  In the worst-case race equilibrium, the first claimant will own just the value of his
exogenous advantage; in the best-case, extreme heterogeneity or the full information game
theory equilibrium, the first claimant will own the full potential value, VS, of the asset.
3.3  The Rule of Capture for Asset Flows
Lueck & Miceli – Property Law
16
When the costs of enforcing a claim to the asset are prohibitive, ownership can be established
only by capturing or "reducing to possession" a flow from the asset. (See the right side of Figure
1.) The rule of capture -- simply a derivation of the rule of first possession -- will occur when
enforcing possession of the flow is cheaper than enforcing possession of the stock.  Wildlife and
crude oil are the classic examples: ownership is established only when a hunter bags a pheasant
or when a barrel of oil is brought to the surface.  The stock itself, be it the pheasant population or
the entire underground reservoir of oil, remains unowned.  As a result, the new "race" is to claim
the present flow R(t) by capturing the product (e.g., the dead pheasant) first.
As a rule of capture, first possession can lead to classic open access dissipation (Epstein 1986,
Lueck 1995).  Under the rule of capture no one owns the asset’s entire stream of flows,
0
( ) .R t dt
∞∫   Now the formal economic analysis of dissipation is just one-period, rather than inter-
temporal as in the race, and in fact is identical to the open access model developed in section 2.1,
with an equilibrium level of effort given equation (2.2).
3.4.   First Possession in Law
The law of first possession is generally consistent with the model that includes two potential
paths of dissipation (racing and over-exploitation).  When first possession has the potential for a
race, the law tends to mitigate dissipation by assigning possession when claimant heterogeneity
is greatest.  On the other hand, when first possession breeds a rule of capture, the law tends to
limit access and restrict the transfer of access rights to limit open access exploitation.  It should
be noted that judicial opinions and statutes may use such terms as “first in time, first in right,”
“priority in time,” or the “rule of capture.” Regardless of the precise legal terminology, all of the
subjects examined below are governed by rules in which legitimate ownership is created by
establishing possession before anyone else.  Table 1 summarizes some important first possession
rules.39
[Table 1 here]
In those cases where first possession rules establish ownership in a resource stock, a number of
common principles are evident.  First, possession tends to be defined so that valid claims are
made at low cost and before dissipating races begin, thus exploiting claimant heterogeneity.
Second, once rights are established the transfer of rights to the resource is allowed routinely.
Third, the use of auctions or other administrative allocation mechanisms are high cost
alternatives. 
In certain cases, establishing possession of an entire stock is especially costly and leads to the
rule of capture, as in the case of so-called "fugitive" resources (Rose 1986) such as oil and
wildlife.  In these cases a number of common principles can be found.  First, the rule of capture
may not produce severe dissipation when there are but a few users or when there are what Rose
                                                          
39 The analysis here suggests broad confirmation of the economics models, but the literature shows considerable
disagreement among law and economics scholars on the merits of first possession rules (Merrill 1986). For instance,
in studies of homesteading (Anderson and Hill 1990) and water (Williams 1983) first possession has been criticized
as causing wasteful races.  In contrast, studies of the broadcast spectrum (Hazlett 1990), homesteading (Allen 1991),
and patents and mining (Kitch 1977) argue that racing dissipation was minimal.
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(1986) calls "plenteous" goods.  Thus open access may persist optimally as in the case of
nineteenth-century whaling.  Second, when dissipation becomes severe, access to the resource
tends to be limited through legal, contractual, or regulatory methods.  Third, transfer of rights to
capturable flows tends to be restricted.
Even possession under the rule of capture can vary, as illustrated in the famous case of Pierson v.
Post where the court was divided over whether possession of a wild fox was determined by “hot
pursuit” or physical capture.40  A similar distinction was present in nineteenth century Atlantic
whaling (Holmes 1881, Ellickson (1989).  The rule of capture typically required that a whaler’s
harpoon be fixed to the mammal before a legitimate ownership interest was established, the
“fast-fish, loose-fish” rule.  In the case of the aggressive sperm whale, however, the “iron holds
the whale” rule granted ownership to a whaler whose harpoon first was affixed to the whale so
long as the whaler remained in fresh pursuit.  The law seems to recognize how the precise way in
which possession is defined will influence the outcome and tends to define possession so that
waste (e.g., fruitless whaling effort) will be minimized.
What must be done to maintain a legitimate claim?41 Ownership, says Blackstone, remains with
the original taker, “till such time as he does some other act which shows an intention to abandon
it.”42  In general the law tends not to require a claimant to continually exert the effort required for
an initial claim, but he cannot remain an owner without incurring some continued possession
costs (Holmes 1881).43  An owner must actively and continuously enforce his ownership claim,
regardless of whether he obtained ownership by first possession or by subsequent method such as
purchase, inheritance, or bankruptcy.  The law has two responses to a party lax in exerting effort
at continued possession.  If an owner intentionally ignores the property it can become abandoned
and subject to being reclaimed under first possession.  In certain cases, (e.g., minerals,
trademarks, water) specific rules, often lumped together as “use-it-or-lose-it,” have developed to
determine precisely when the right has been abandoned.  If an owner is simply inattentive
enough to allow another party to establish continued use of the property, then adverse users can
ultimately gain ownership under the doctrine of adverse possession (see section 6.1).  Thus the
law requires that an owner continue to exert effort to maintain possession but certainly not to the
degree initially required to establish possession.  In Holmes’s words (1881, p.236): “Everyone
agrees that it is not necessary to have always present power over the thing, otherwise one could
only possess what was under his hand.”  The general rule of not requiring the same effort for
                                                          
40  Pierson v. Post, 1805, 3 Cal. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (Sup. Ct. of N.Y. 1805).  Dharmapala and Pitchford (2002)
develop a formal model of the differential incentives under the two rules.
41 Continued possession or maintenance costs can be added to the first possession model, noting that net rents are
R(t)-c(t) where c(t) is the current cost of maintaining possession.  This addition will increase t* in the claim model.
42 Book II, Chapter 1. Of course, property rights can also be relinquished by gift or sale to another.
43 This principle is clearly articulated in the famous “dung case,” Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500 (1871).  In
Haslem the plaintiff was a farmer who gathered manure from the ditch along a public highway into “heaps”, leaving
them overnight while he returned to his farm to get a cart for transport of the heaps.  Before he returned the
defendant had begun to load the heaps and take them away.  The court, in deciding for the plaintiff, ruled that the
manure was abandoned property in the public ditch, that the plaintiff established ownership via first possession by
piling the dung into heaps, and finally, that the plaintiff having established ownership did not have to exert the same
effort to maintain possession and was therefore justified in returning home to fetch his carts.  Implicit in this case
and elsewhere is the fact that collective institutions (e.g., courts, custom, police) actively enforce property rights
once they are established, thus minimizing the resources devoted to continued possession.
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continuing possession as for establishing possession recognizes economies of enforcement by
collective institutions and a protection of specific investments by the original claimant.
A first possession rule that leads to an optimal system of ownership for one attribute can leave rights
unspecified to another attribute.44  Establishing rights to land for farming, for instance, might create
a system of rights inconsistent with the optimal use of wildlife or groundwater.  The process of
establishing possession might cause damage to adjacent environmental assets, as when the
diversion of water under prior appropriation damages in-stream resources (Leshy 1987,
Sprankling 1996). Indeed, the application of first possession to environmental goods (e.g., scenic
view) is not well developed in the law.  Private contracting to consolidate land holdings is a
possible solution to the ownership problem for the attached resource, but this is an imperfect
solution when contracting costs are positive (Libecap and Wiggins 1984).  For example, detailed
property rights to small, urban parcels of land can lead to severe open access dissipation for
subsurface oil and gas production.
Possession rules can also swing dramatically from a rule of capture to a perpetual right to a
stock.  Water law illustrates the issue clearly.  Under absolute ownership a landowner can claim
groundwater under the rule of capture by pumping water to the surface; under prior
appropriation, however, a successful first claimant earns a permanent withdrawal right to a
measured quantity extracted each year.   Indeed, such a switch in regimes begs the question of
what is the actual stock that is valuable to potential users.  Is the bison herd the valuable stock, or
is a single bison (which can yield meat and hides) a valuable stock in its own right?  Ultimately
the answer depends on the uses of the resource as well as on the relative costs (e.g., claiming
possession, enforcing common property).
While their treatment in legal texts often suggests otherwise, first possession rules are still relevant
and likely to be important in the future.  Berger (1985) notes many cases not examined here where
first possession is the primary rule.  For example, while the common law has tended to move away
from the “coming to the nuisance” doctrine (Wittman, 1980), nearly all states have enacted “right to
farm” statutes which effectively codify this first possession principle; namely, that no one can make
a legitimate nuisance claim for activities in place prior to a location decision by the affected party
(Berger 1985).  The recent environmental policies that use transferable use or access permits
require an initial allocation of property rights.  For both fisheries regulations that use individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) and pollution emission systems with transferable permits, rights tend
to be established by being grandfathered in to the permit system.  For fisheries, allocations have
been based on historical catch; for pollution, allocation has been based on historical emissions
(e.g., sulfur dioxide trading program under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990).  Some
economists have considered this a “free distribution” (e.g., Stavins 1995) or “give away,” but it
is more appropriately viewed as an allocation based on first possession.  In these cases, first
possession may protect the specific investments made by the original users of the assets and
avoid the administrative and rent-seeking costs of auctions.  Though it might seem reasonable to
think that the era of discovering new resources has long passed, space (McDougal et al. 1963)
and the deep sea may have surprises to offer.  In space, geosynchronous satellite orbits have been
claimed by first possessors, but the deep sea has been treated differently. For example, Epstein
(1979) noted that the Law of the Sea conference rejected first possession rules for allocating
                                                          
44 Nuisance law, as discussed in section 7.4, mitigates these problems.
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claims to deep sea minerals, while recent legislation awards ownership of abandoned shipwrecks
found in U.S. waters to the federal government rather than to the finder (Hallwood and Miceli,
2004).   
3.5.   Alternatives: Auctions, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Violence
Law and economics scholars studying first possession have often recommended auctions as the
efficient method of establishing rights without closely examining the costs of auctions (e.g.,
Barzel 1968, Coase 1959, Haddock 1986, Posner 1992, Williams 1983). Assuming the same
costs of establishing the rights (C), the winner of the “ideal” auction pays VS and begins
production at tS, thus maximizing the value of the asset.  Yet, in practice, auctions will entail real
and often large costs (Epstein 1979, McMillan 1994). Under first possession, private claimants
must bear the cost, Ce-rt, of enforcing a claim to the resource.  Similarly, before the auction can
take place, the state must establish rights to the asset at a cost, CSe-rt, and also incur costs, CAe-rt,
of administering the auction.  In addition, the state must survey and police the resource,
determine what size parcels of the asset to sell, the method of auction to use, and so on
(McMillan 1994).  If the state cannot protect property rights adequately after the auction,
potential buyers will bid less than V*. 45
Epstein (1979) also notes that interest groups will attempt to alter the auction rules to suit their
own advantage, leading to further dissipation of rent.  Indeed, he notes that administrative
alternatives simply were not available (i.e., too costly) during much of the development of the
common law. As a result, only if the state's costs (CS + CA)e-rt are less than Ce-rt will V* result
from an auction.  The choice between auctions (or other administrative policies) and first
possession is ultimately a trade-off between costly auctions and potential dissipation from races.
In some cases -- future patentable innovations, sunken treasure, and the unused electromagnetic
spectrum -- the resource cannot be auctioned because it has yet to be identified.
4. The Evolution of Property Rights
To this point several different property rights regimes have been studied in isolation, and the
establishment of rights has been considered under the rule of first possession. This section
examines the determinants of changes in property rights and how these changes take place.
Though changes or differences in property rights can be examined with cross section or time
series data, the earliest studies focused on temporal changes, and thus the term “evolution of
property rights” has come to define the literature.46
4.1 The Demsetz Thesis
The evolution of property rights is one of the oldest topics in the economics of property rights
beginning with Demsetz’ (1967) pioneering paper. Demsetz argues that property rights emerge
to internalize the externalities present in open access. Further, in what has become the classic
                                                          
45 Allen (1991) argues that this is the reason homesteading was often chosen over auctions for assigning rights to
frontier land in many countries.
46 Anderson and Hill (1975) appear to be the originators of this phrase.  Recently the Journal of Legal Studies (Vol.
31, No.2 (part 2) (June 2002) published a special issue titled “The Evolution of Property Rights.”
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argument on the topic, he argues that an increase in the value of an asset will increase the gains
from ownership and thus lead to the creation of property rights.  In support of this thesis,
Demsetz recounts the anthropological evidence of alterations in property rights among the
Montagne Indians of Quebec during the 18th century. Prior to the emergence of the beaver trade
with Europeans, rights to beaver could be characterized as open access.  However, once the trade
increased their value, property rights to beaver populations emerged and were held by family
units.  The story of the emergence of rights to beaver among the Montagne has become the most
famous story in the economics of property rights.
4.2. Empirical studies
Demsetz’ thesis was not again explored until Anderson and Hill’s (1975) study of the emergence
of property rights to rangeland, livestock, and water in the American West.  Anderson and Hill
argue that the history of the west is largely consistent with Demsetz’ thesis; as the frontier was
settled assets became more valuable, and property rights emerged out of what we would now all
open access. In a remarkably convincing historical analysis they show how the range was
privatized after the introduction of barbed wire dramatically reduced the cost of enforcing rights
to grasslands.  This history shows how, holding resource values constant, changes in property
rights enforcement costs can have dramatic affects on the choice of property rights regimes. 47
Umbeck (1977) and Libecap (1978) similarly study the establishment of rights to gold and silver
fields in California and Nevada, respectively, and find a history that again corresponds to
Demsetz’ beaver.  In fact, the California gold rush is an even better application than the beaver
because the discovery of gold signified a sharp increase in the asset’s value and the property
system that developed was much more detailed than that developed by the Montagne.
Furthermore, for the gold case, there was no preexisting society as in the Montage case; open
access truly was the prior regime.  In his sweeping study of economic history, North (1981)
suggests that the general rise of agricultural societies, with private property rights in land, is
consistent with this view of emerging rights. Indeed, one might argue that the settlement of
North America is broadly consistent as well.48 Over time rights to land, water, minerals, and
even air in recent times, have been established as asset values have increased.
Econometric evidence to test the Demsetz thesis has been scarce because of the severe data
requirements.  Such a test requires data on property rights regimes and the relevant economic
parameters.  Quantification of property regimes is particularly difficult and over a time series
even harder.  Libecap (1978), however, couples his historical account of changes in mining law
with some econometric evidence, showing in a short time series that mining law became more
precise as the value of mineral deposits increased.  More recently Geddes and Lueck (2002) use
panel data on state laws defining the rights of married women to hold property and contract, and
find that states with a greater potential value of human capital (as approximated by levels of
wealth, education, and the size of the market) tended to be the first states to expand rights for
women.  Geddes and Lueck’s study is consistent with Demsetz and also with Schultz (1968) who
                                                          
47 What is not discussed in Anderson and Hill is the destruction of Native American property regimes as these assets
values increase.
48 Eggertsson (1990) summarizes this literature; see also the Journal of Legal Studies (2002).
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noted that individual freedoms (or rights to one’s own human capital) have tended to increase
with increases in the value of human capital.
Despite numerous studies in support of the Demsetz thesis, there are many instances where
property rights did not emerge even as asset values increased considerably.  The case of oil and
gas is the most dramatic, where rights to underground reservoirs remained subject to a rule of
capture (see section 3.1) even as the value of these resources rose dramatically (Libecap 1989,
Libecap and Smith 2002).   Rights to the oil and gas stocks themselves took nearly a century to
develop and did not ever emerge in common law doctrine.  In another example, property rights
never emerged for the wild bison herds despite the rather dramatic increase in the market value
of the bison with the advent of the bison hide market (Lueck 2002).  In fact, it is precisely during
the period of the most intense market activity that the bison’s demise was swiftest.  Property
rights to marine fisheries often have also remained open access for extended periods, despite
significant increases in the asset’s value.
4.3.   The Theory of Rights Evolution and Variation
Demsetz’ original theory was informal and simple: increases in the net benefits of enforcing
rights would increase the level of rights enforcement.  His main theoretical contribution was
simply and importantly to note that property rights themselves are economic goods amenable to
the tools of economic theory and potentially subject to empirical analysis.  While it seems trivial
now, as do many breakthroughs, the insight has been critical to the economics of property rights
and institutions.  Yet, Demsetz did not develop a formal model, and his paper said little about the
costs of a property regime, the mechanism of choosing rights, and the form of property rights.
Umbeck (1977) was the first to formalize Demsetz in his study of the California gold rush.
Umbeck postulates that the net value of rights (V) was simply the benefits of rights (B) less the
cost of enforcing rights (C).  He postulates further that B was exactly the market value R of the
asset (e.g., the price of a beaver pelt, or the rental value of a plot of land), and that enforcement
costs positively depended on the asset value C=c0+c (R) where c’(R) > 0.  The first-best, or zero
transaction cost value of the asset is V* = R, but the second-best value of the asset is V = R−
C(R).  Property rights emerge only when R > C(R), so that for low asset values the asset remains
unowned.  This is exactly the Demsetz thesis.49
Implicit in the Demsetz model was the assumption that the there will exist an asset value for
which R = C, so that there are values for which property rights will be enforced and values for
which they will not.  Umbeck, however, notes that this outcome depends on the structure of the
enforcement cost function C.50  It is possible that as asset values increase there may be an even
greater incentive to steal the asset thus raising enforcement costs. Simply, if enforcement costs
rise faster than asset values, then the implication is that no property rights will be established at
all, regardless of how high the asset value becomes.  Formally, this simply means that if c’(R) >
                                                          
49 The first possession model from section 3.1.1 also implies that rights will emerge over time as asset values
increase, given some costs of claiming and a first possession rule.
50 Field (1986) also notes that enforcement costs depend on asset values.  His model focuses on the number of
owners of a tract of land, or what he calls the ‘optimal number of commons.’
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1,51 then no rights will be established because C(R) > R for all values of R. This means the only
clear prediction from the model is that parametric decreases in enforcement costs will increase
the probability that property rights will emerge.52  Thus changes in asset values do not give
unambiguous predictions. Allen (2002) notes that enforcement costs might actually be increasing
and convex in asset values (i.e., c’(R) > 0, c’’(R) > 0).  This extension implies that at lower asset
values, an increase would lead to the establishment of property rights, but that at higher asset
values, a further increase could actually lead to a reversal or abandonment of property rights.53 A
consideration of complex assets can also alter the model (Lueck 2002). If, for instance, land is
valuable for the production of both bison and wheat, then an increase the value of bison might
not lead to an increase in rights to bison if this increase is correlated with an increase in the value
of wheat, which requires land ownership on a smaller scale than is optimal for bison.
The choice of property rights can be put in a framework in which the maximization problem is
max {V1 , … , Vn}  where Vi is the net value of the asset generated under the ith property rights
regime (e.g., common property, state property, private property).54  Each regime’s value depends
on market parameters and transaction cost parameters. With many viable choices an analytical
solution may be not be available, but in many empirical settings the choices may be rather
limited. In the case of just two alternative property regimes, comparative statics predictions can
be generated from ( )i jV V χ∂ ∂ , where Vi and Vj are value functions for property regimes i and j
and χ is a parameter.  If this derivative can be signed, then there is a prediction for the choice of
property regime.
4.4.   The Mechanism of Rights Changes
The analysis of the mechanism by which property rights are established can be divided into
several categories.  First, there is what might be called an ‘institutional invisible hand,’ which
can be attributed to Demsetz and even to Coase (1960). This is often linked to the common law
(Posner, 2003).   The evidence on whether the law has evolved in a manner consistent with
efficient property rights is mixed.  The development of the prior appropriation water doctrine in
the western states seems to be an affirmative case. In one of the defining cases, Coffin et al., v.
Left Hand Ditch Co.,55 a Colorado court noted that the riparian system used in eastern states was
not useful for western water, which needed to be diverted for use.  Yet, in recent years courts in
western states have been reluctant to allow water rights to be defined for increasingly valuable
‘instream uses’ such as those for recreation and wildlife.56
Second, game theory suggests that in the presence of repeated interaction, agents in open access
can generate conventions or norms in which the parties agree to create a system of rights
(Sugden 1986). For instance, Sugden (1986) suggests an evolutionary explanation for such
property conventions as ‘first possession’ and respect for property rights.  Experimental work by
                                                          
51 Since B = R, B’ = 1.
52 The case of the barbed wire fence fits this prediction (Anderson and Hill 1975).
53 Such reversals have been noted by Anderson and Hill (1975) and Smith (2002).
54 Under the conditions of the Coase Theorem, of course, each regime would generate identical asset use and value.
55 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
56 Only recent statutory changes have allowed the definition of these rights, suggesting that there is a tradeoff
between common law and statutory rule-making. Similar outcomes can be found in the law of oil and gas, wildlife,
and groundwater.
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James Walker that shows how property regimes can emerge with repeated interaction, even with
anonymous players.   
A third line of analysis, closely related to the second, is contracting for rights (Libecap 1989).
That is, when the gains from another ownership regime exist, there is the potential for existing
users or those who have access to form a deal to establish a new regime.  Such an outcome is
explicit in the formation of a unitization agreement to establish rights to an underground oil
reservoir among parties who previously operated under a rule of capture.   For such a contract to
be an economic equilibrium there has to be rent from the new property regime, and each party to
the contract must expect to increase their own rents.  In the language of modern contract theory,
a successful contract must satisfy the incentive compatibility and rationality constraints of all
parties.  Libecap (1989) finds that in many cases there is sufficient heterogeneity and information
asymmetry among contracting parties that it is prohibitively costly to find a contract that meets
the individual rationality constraints of all.  Thus open access under a rule of capture can persist
even when the potential rents are enormous.
A fourth mechanism by which rights can be established is through politics and statutory rule-
making.57  Since rights are often initiated via political institutions, there must be rents for the
political actors (e.g., politicians, interest groups, and bureaucrats) to implement the changes.
Thus, there is yet another set of incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints to
add to the purely private contracting model. Rose (1998) recognizes these forces and, without
developing a model, suggests that the modern evolution of rights to environmental goods has
been more or less consistent with the Demsetz thesis.  Riker and Sened (1991) explicitly show
how transferable rights to airport landing slots – established in the 1980s -- did not emerge until
the Secretary of Transportation and the Office of Management and Budget signed on.
5. Voluntary Transfers of Property
This section examines voluntary transfers of property, including market transfers (sales) and
leases (temporary transfers).  It also examines laws governing inheritance, or the transfer of
property from one generation to the next.  For the most part, the focus is on transfers of land,
though the principles are more general.
5.1. Market Transfers
In addition to the use and investment incentives inherent in private ownership, there are the
allocation incentives inherent in the market transfer of private property rights. Indeed, the
Invisible Hand Theorem of Adam Smith establishes that market transfers of property achieve an
efficient allocation of resources in the absence of market failure, but a pre-requisite for market
transfer is a well-functioning system for defining and protecting ownership rights.  This is simply
a restatement of the Coase Theorem.
 As the Coase Theorem implies, because transaction costs are positive and property rights are
imperfect actual market transfers must contend with various problems of enforcement. One
particularly important problem in the transfer of property rights is the possibility of a claim by a
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previously defrauded owner.  An important function of property law is to minimize the
uncertainty over ownership, thereby facilitating market exchange (Baird and Jackson, 1984).
Information about potential prior claims on property is costly, however, so an efficient system
for enforcing or maintaining ownership will balance the cost of greater certainty against the
benefit.  For example, consider a parcel of land worth V if ownership is certain, but subject to a
risk p(x) that a past owner will assert a claim based on error or fraud, where x is the effort (in
dollar terms) devoted to ensuring title. This might represent the cost of searching a public record
of past transactions or obtaining a government certification of ownership.  Assume that p′<0 and
p″>0.  The owner’s problem is to choose x to maximize (1-p(x))V−x, which must satisfy
−p′(x)V=1, or, marginal search costs must equal the expected reduction in the value of the parcel.
It follows that it is not generally optimal (p(x*) > 0) to eliminate all risk of loss, though owners
of more valuable property will invest more to secure ownership.58
Actual efforts to protect ownership of property, both public and private, vary in accordance with
this conclusion.  All jurisdictions in the U.S. maintain a public record of transactions for land and
also certify title to automobiles, thereby providing buyers with some guarantee of good title,
while owners often invest in private security systems and insurance to further protect their
interests.  For property of lesser value, buyers generally rely on possession and the reputation of
the current owner as the primary evidence of ownership.
5.1.1. Title Systems for Land
Land title in the U.S. is primarily protected by a recording system that allows potential buyers to
verify title by searching the record of past transfers, theoretically back to the root of ownership.59
Title search is a costly process, however, especially as one goes back in time and the quality of
records deteriorates.  Most states therefore have enacted statutes of limitation (so-called
Marketable Title Acts), or less formal guidelines (established by local bars or title insurers),
aimed at limiting title searches to a reasonable length. Baker, et al. (2002) develop a sequential
search model to characterize how far back in time buyers should search a title, and test the model
using cross-state data.  The results of the analysis show that these guidelines vary according to
the predictions of the theory.   
Although the recording system is the predominant land title system in the U.S., common law
countries (and some states) have also used a system of land registration, called the Torrens
system.60  Under land registration, the government certifies ownership at the time of a transfer,
thereby protecting the owner against nearly all claims.  Thus, claimants can at most seek
monetary compensation from a public fund (financed by registration fees).  This is in contrast to
the recording system, which awards successful claimants an interest in the land itself.
Landowners subject to this system thus ordinarily purchase title insurance to provide them with
financial compensation in the event of a loss.
                                                          
58 This comes from the comparative statics derivative ∂x*/∂V=−p′/p″V > 0.
59 According to Black’sLaw Dictionary ‘title is the means whereby the owner of land has the just possession of his
property.  A ‘deed’ is a legal document which constitutes evidence of title.
60 See, for example, Bostick (1987) and Shick and Plotkin (1978).
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The two title systems therefore provide opposing answers to the fundamental question of whom a
title system should protect, the current possessor or the last rightful owner (Baird and Jackson,
1984).  The question is whether one is preferred on efficiency grounds.  If transaction costs are
zero, land will be used efficiently under both systems, and the only effect will be distributional
(Miceli and Sirmans, 1995a).  In reality, however, the transaction costs of land transfer are
significant, in which case the preferred system is the one that minimizes these costs, thereby
facilitating exchange and investment (Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull, 1998).
Proponents of land registration claim that it lowers transaction costs relative to the recording
system because it dispenses with the need to search anew the entire history of a parcel with each
transfer.  Actual attempts to compare the costs of registration and recording in those jurisdictions
in the U.S. where they co-exist, however, have yielded mixed results (Janczyk, 1977; Shick and
Plotkin, 1978).  Such comparisons, however, may miss the chief advantage of registration--
namely, that it clears title to land in cases where land records are poor or have been destroyed.
For example, land registration was instituted in Cook County, Illinois following the Great
Chicago Fire, which destroyed nearly all land records.  A recent study of land transactions in that
county found that landowners whose property was most at risk disproportionately entered the
registration system.  Once this self-selection effect was controlled for, the study found that land
values in the sample were higher under the registration system as compared to the recording
system (Miceli, et al. 2002).
5.1.2. Title Systems and Development
Economists have recently begun to examine the role of land title systems in promoting economic
development.  For example, De Soto (2000) argues that the absence of a well-functioning system
for protecting land ownership is the single largest impediment to economic growth in most
developing countries.  Lack of secure title inhibits land sales, discourages investment, and
prevents owners from converting land assets (which are abundant) into financial capital.  De
Soto’s evidence is largely anecdotal, but several empirical studies have established a clear link
between formal land title and economic investment in various developing countries (Besley,
1995; Alston, et al., 1996; Miceli, Sirmans, and Kieyah, 2002).  De Soto also makes the
argument that legally enforced property rights are superior to those enforced by extra-legal
means, thus emphasizing the economic importance of law.
5.2. Leases
A lease represents a voluntary transfer of possessory rights in property (the right of use) for a
limited period of time.  Such an arrangement can enhance efficiency by allowing gains from
specialization. The division of ownership and use, however, creates potential incentive problems
for both landlords and tenants regarding the optimal maintenance and use of the property. The
problem is one of moral hazard, though it is sometimes referred to as the “rental externality”
(Henderson and Ioannides, 1983).
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To illustrate, suppose that the value of a piece of property, V(x,y), is an increasing function of
inputs by both the tenant (x) and the landlord (y).61  Further, suppose that V is divided into the
value of the property to the tenant during the term of the lease, T(x,y), and the residual value (the
value of the reversion), R(x,y).  The first-best choices of x and y maximize the joint value of the
property, V(x,y)−x−y, but both the landlord and tenant will make their choices to maximize their
individual returns.  Specifically, the tenant will choose x to maximize T(x,y)−x−r, where r is the
rent, while the landlord will choose y to maximize R(x,y)−y+r.  Given a fixed rent, both parties
will therefore underinvest in maintenance.  We will see that several aspects of lease law can be
interpreted as responses to this problem.
5.2.1. The Lease: A Contract or a Conveyance
Historically, all leases fell under the law of property, which viewed the lease as a conveyance of
an interest in land to the tenant (Dukeminier and Krier 2002).  This gave the tenant the right to
exclude the landlord from entry during the term of the lease in return for a promise to pay rent.
Yet even if the tenant defaulted on the rent, the landlord could not evict the tenant; he could only
sue for recovery of the rent.  At the same time, the landlord had no duty to maintain the premises
during the lease period.  The lease thus provided strong protection of the tenant’s possessory
interest in the property.
In contrast, modern leases, usually for housing, are generally viewed by courts as contracts rather
than conveyances.62  This change has altered the obligations of the parties in important ways.
First, landlords have a duty to maintain the property in a habitable state according to an “implied
warranty of habitability,”63 which tenants can enforce by withholding rent.  Symmetrically,
however, landlords who meet their duty of maintenance can evict tenants who fail to pay rent.
The obligations of the landlord and tenant, like those of the parties to a contract, are therefore
mutual.
From an economic perspective, this change in the law makes sense (Miceli, Sirmans, and
Turnbull, 2001).  Historical leases were primarily for agricultural land, and landlord inputs were
relatively less important. (In the context of the above model, T did not depend on y.)  In this
context, legal protection of a strong possessory interest promoted efficient tenant investment
during the term of the lease.  For example, landlords could not opportunistically re-take
possession of the land after the crops were planted but before harvest. Further, tenant use
ordinarily did not have a detrimental effect on the value of the reversion (i.e., R did not depend
on x).
The situation is different in modern real estate leases, which are primarily for housing.  Now,
landlord maintenance during the term of the lease is crucial, so the law has provided tenants with
an enforcement mechanism by transforming the lease into a contract with an implied warranty of
habitability.64 In addition, tenant inputs are much more likely to have an effect on the value of
                                                          
61 Thus, both inputs can be interpreted as maintenance.  The analysis would not change if the tenant input is
interpreted as the rate of utilization, which has a negative impact on V.
62 In some states, commercial leases are still interpreted as conveyances.
63 The key case is Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (1970).  Also see Rabin (1984).
64 See Hirsch (1999, Ch. 3) for an empirical analysis of the impact of habitability laws.
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the landlord’s reversion.  For example, overutilization of rental housing will accelerate the rate of
depreciation.  The law addresses this problem with the doctrine of waste (Posner, 2003, p. 73),
under which a tenant has a duty to invest in reasonable maintenance of the property.  In terms of
the above model, this forces the tenant to internalize the effect of his actions on the value of the
reversion.  The doctrine of waste and the warranty of habitability thus work in combination to
create efficient bilateral incentives for maintenance in the presence of the rental externality.65
5.2.2. The Duty to Mitigate Damages
Another effect of the transformation of the lease from a conveyance to a contract concerns the
duty to mitigate damages.  Under the law of property, landlords had no duty to mitigate damages.
If the tenant abandoned the property, the landlord had no obligation to attempt to re-let it; he
could just sit tight and sue the tenant for the entire rent.  The transformation of the lease to a
form of contract, however, imposed on landlords the contractual duty to mitigate damages by
taking all reasonable steps to re-let the property.66  The law enforces this duty by limiting the
damages from tenant breach to the difference between the contract rent and the best rent the
landlord could have obtained by reasonable efforts.
Mitigation of damages provides a clear economic benefit by preventing the property from being
left idle.  Thus, it appears to be an efficient aspect of lease law. However, this raises the question
of why the traditional law of leases did not impose such a duty.  Economic theory suggests three
possible reasons.  First, agricultural tenants may have been in a better position than landlords to
find substitute tenants, whereas the situation is reversed for modern residential leases.  The
change in the law thus simply reflects an application of the cheaper cost-avoider principle.
Second, a duty to mitigate damages may result in inefficient re-letting of the property by
landlords who mistakenly interpret tenant absence as a sign of breach.  The no-mitigate rule
therefore protects the tenant’s possessory rights in settings where absentee use may be valuable--
a situation that is more reflective of agricultural as compared to residential leases.   A third
possibility is that in agricultural settings the law is often less important than market enforcement
via repeated interaction (Allen and Lueck 2003).  For agriculture the law simply may not have
developed to address this issue.
5.2.3. Sharecrop versus Cash Rent Leases in Agriculture
The choice between a cash rent lease and a cropshare lease has been an important topic since the
beginning of economics.67 Adam Smith argued that the cropshare acted as an inefficient tax on
effort. Writing roughly a century later than Smith, however, John Stuart Mill noted that
cropshare leases had an ancient origin and that the level of cultivation was not suffering.  Thus,
he was reluctant to claim widespread inefficiency. Smith's tax analogy, however, influenced
Alfred Marshall and other neoclassical economists who later analyzed the problem. Not until
Cheung (1968) extended the Coase Theorem into share cropping did the modern analysis begin.
                                                          
65 In this sense, the two doctrines resemble the tort rule of negligence with a contributory negligence defense, which
establishes efficient bilateral incentives in accident settings.  See Chapter xx.
66 See generally Goetz and Scott (1983).
67 Allen and Lueck (2003, chapter 4) give a detailed history of this literature.
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Cheung demonstrates that if transaction costs are zero, then all land leases must be equivalent,
and that, therefore, the (lease) contract choice must depend on transaction costs.68
We present a model from Allen and Lueck (2003) that recognizes the complexity of assets and
property rights to those assets as discussed in section 2.4.  In both a cash rent and cropshare
lease, property rights to the land are imperfect.  Typically a lease agreement can only specify and
enforce such basic parameters as acreage of the plot and type of crop.  Such important features as
soil moisture and soil nutrients cannot be economically enforced in the lease, so these attributes
are essentially open access goods.  In a cash rent lease the farmer pays a fixed annual amount per
acre of land and owns the entire crop.  As a result he supplies the optimal amount of his own
inputs but overuses any inputs provided by the landowner, including the un-priced attributes of
the land.  In a cropshare lease, in contrast, the farmer does not pay any fee for use of the land but
simply pays a predetermined share of the crop to the landowner at the time of harvest.  In this
arrangement the farmer and the landowner have shared ownership of the crop, so the farmer has
an incentive, as Adam Smith noted, to under-provide these inputs.  The farmer will also have less
incentive to use inputs provided by the landowner, compared to a cash rent lease.
Consider a tract of farmland which can be used to produce crops according to Q = h(e,l)+θ
where Q is the harvested crop, e is the farmer’s composite input called effort, l is a composite
input of land quality attributes, and θ ∼ (0, σ2) is a randomly distributed composite input that
includes weather and pests.  We assume that h e > 0, hl > 0, hee < 0, hll < 0, and hel = 0, where
the subscripts denote partial derivatives. The opportunity cost of the farmer's input is the
competitive wage rate w per unit of farmer's effort, and the opportunity cost of the unpriced land
input l is r per unit.
With risk-neutral landowners and farmers, the expected profit from the farming operation is
maximized, resulting in the employment of e* and l* units of farmer and landowner inputs.
These first-best input levels are identical for the cropshare and cash rent leases and satisfy the
standard conditions that marginal products equal marginal costs for both inputs.  When
transaction costs are positive and lease enforcement is costly, however, the input choices will be
second-best. In either lease, farmers have an incentive to exploit the land's un-priced attribute
because they do not face the full costs. In addition, farmers have an incentive to under-report the
output in the cropshare lease.
For the cash rent lease, the farmer owns the entire crop and chooses his inputs to maximize
expected profit.  Because the farmer does not have indefinite tenure of the land, he does not face
the true opportunity cost of using the attributes of the land.  If we denote the reduced costs he
faces as r' < r, the farmer's objective is:
,
max ( , ) ' .r
e l
h e l we r lΠ = − − (5.1)
The second-best solutions er and lr satisfy ( )reh e w≡  and ( ) '.rlh l r≡  Since hel = 0, we note that
the farmer's input level is identical to the first-best optimum; that is, er = e*.  However, since
r'<r,, the land is over-worked (lr>l*) because the farmer does not face the full cost of using the
land's attributes.
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In a cropshare lease, the farmer receive sQ and the landowner receives (1−s)Q, where 0 < s < 1.
The farmer's objective is:
,
max [ ( , )] ' .s
e l
s h e l we r lΠ = − − (5.2)
Now the second-best solutions es and ls satisfy ( )sesh e w≡  and ( ) '.slsh l r≡   These solutions
indicate that the farmer supplies too few of his inputs because he must share the output with the
landowner; that is es < e*.  As with cash rent, the farmer over uses the land attributes, or ls > l*;
however, since lr > ls > l*, the use of the land is less excessive than it is with cash rent. This
means that although a share lease still provides the farmer with an incentive to over use the land,
this incentive is not as powerful as it is with the cash rent lease.
Farmers and landowners choose the lease that maximizes the joint expected return to the tract of
land.  This requires comparing the expected net return to the land in both leases, where the net
return is given by the appropriate indirect objective function. For the cash rent lease,
( , , ') ( , ) .r r r r rV w r r h e l we rl= − − (5.3)
With the cropshare lease there are additional costs of measuring and dividing the harvested crop
(Barzel 1982, Holmstrom and Milgrom 1992).  These costs are given by µ so that the net value
function is,
( , , ', ) ( , ) .s s s s sV w r r h e l we rlµ µ= − − − (5.4)
The joint maximization problem is max {Vr,Vs}. The tradeoff between the two leases is
straightforward.69 The benefit of cash rent is the avoidance of the costs of dividing the harvested
ouptut.  The benefit of cropshare is the reduction in the total distortion of input levels. Thus
cropsharing should be observed when output measurement costs are low, and when soil attributes
are easy to exploit. Cash rent leases should be observed under the opposite conditions. The effect
of parameter changes on the net value of each contract can illuminate this tradeoff and lead to
hypotheses about lease choice.
Consider first how changes in µ affect Vr and Vs. The net value of the cash rent lease Vr does not
depend on output division costs.  The net value of the crop share lease Vs however, declines as
these costs increase. By the Envelope Theorem 0.sV µ∂ ∂ <   This implies that as the costs of
output division increase it is less likely that the cropshare contract will be chosen.  The
comparative statics for r are similar. By the Envelope Theorem s sV r l∂ ∂ = −  and .s rV r l∂ ∂ = −
Because neither ls nor lr depend on r, the second derivatives of Vs and Vr with respect to r are
zero.  Therefore, Vs and Vr are linear functions of r.  Thus, an increase in the cost of land
attributes will lower the value of either lease (holding r'  constant), but it will lower the value of
the cash rent lease more because land inputs are used more intensively in a cash rent lease than in
                                                          
69 The formal comparative statics predictions are derived in Allen and Lueck (2003, chapter 4).
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a cropshare lease (lr > ls).  This implies that a cropshare lease is more likely to be chosen both as
the unpriced attributes of the land become more easily damaged, and as land value increases.
Allen and Lueck (2002) find support for these predictions using data from North America and
evidence from around the world.  They show that cropshare leases are more likely when crop
division costs are low and where the ability of farmers to adversely affect the soil is high, and
that cash rent leases often contain clauses that discourage exploitation of the soil. For example,
hay crops are more susceptible to under-reporting, since they are used on the premises and found
to be more often cash rented.  Land used for row crops is more susceptible to overuse than is
land used for grains, and the data show that row crops are more likely to be cropshared.
The property rights - transaction cost approach to leases assumes that everyone is risk neutral,
and relies on a trade-off between different incentive margins to explain lease terms.  This
approach contrasts with the dominant economic approach – the traditional Principal-Agent (P-A)
model – which assumes leases (or generally contracts) are designed to balance risk against moral
hazard incentives. Despite the prominence of the risk-sharing paradigm (Newberry and Stiglitz
1979, Hayami and Otsuka 1993), the empirical evidence to support its implications is scarce,
especially for agriculture. In one of the early studies to confront risk-sharing and contract choice,
Rao (1971) found that crops with high yield and profit variability were less likely to be
sharecropped than crops with low yield and profit variability – a refutation of the P-A model.
Using data from several thousand farmland leases, Allen and Lueck (1999, 2003) present a series
of empirical tests that find virtually no support for the risk-share approach. In a variety of
empirical tests, Allen and Lueck find no support for the general hypothesis that share leases are
more likely to be chosen over cash rent leases when crop riskiness increases. In fact, there is
evidence that the relationship is the opposite; that is, as crop riskiness (in terms of yield
variability) increases, cash rent leases are often more likely (Allen and Lueck 1995, 2003, and
Prendergast 2000, 2002). This result holds across all crops and regions examined in Allen and
Lueck (2003).70
Compared to the basic P-A model, the transaction cost approach does not explicitly distinguish
between principals and agents, nor does it make differential assumption about the risk
preferences of the contracting parties. In modern farming it is especially difficult to establish
such a dichotomy because farmers and landowners have nearly identical demographic
characteristics.  Both farmers and landowners make decisions, so formal models more in line
with double moral hazard are more appropriate (e.g., Eswaran and Kotwol, 1985; Prendergast
2002). More importantly, by diverting attention away from risk-sharing – which is hard to test
and has thus far generated little empirical support – the approach opens the door to a wider array
of pure incentive effects that shape organization.
5.3. Inheritance of Land
                                                          
70 Outside the area of agriculture a series of papers have found similar results (see the summary in Prendergast
2002). Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), however, argue that risk sharing might still be important in contract choice if
one takes into account the endogenous matching of farmer with different risk preferences and land suitable to crops
of varying risk. Nearly all of this literature can be criticized though for data that does not reliably measure
exogenous risk.
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Inheritance rules govern the intergenerational transfer of land and other property.  One function
of these rules is to ensure that the wishes of testators regarding the disposal of their property are
fulfilled -- in this sense, inheritance is a voluntary transfer -- but an offsetting concern is to limit
the extent to which the “dead hand” can constrain the uses of property into the uncertain future
(Stake, 1998).  In attempting to balance these goals, Anglo-American law gives testators
considerable freedom in the disposal of their property, but imposes some constraints.  We discuss
two here: primogeniture and the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The rule of primogeniture, under which all property passes to a decedent’s eldest son, was the
predominant rule in early English common law and has also been used in cultures throughout the
world. The most common economic explanation for the rule is that it prevents inefficient
fragmentation of land (Posner, 2003, p. 517). There are, however, two objections to this
rationale.  First, a well-functioning land market should allow entrepreneurs to counteract the
effects of fragmentation.  Thus, we would expect the rule to be most prevalent in societies where
land markets are primitive or do not exist. (Baker, et al. (2004) provide evidence for this
prediction.)  Second, even if scale economies are important, why constrain a testator’s choice of
the most suitable inheritor?  One possible explanation is that a “best-qualified” rule might
promote wasteful rent seeking by competing heirs (Buchanan, 1983).
Another constraint on a testator’s discretion is the Rule Against Perpetuities, which limits
restrictions that can be imposed in a will to a set period of time, equal to the lifetime of anyone
alive when the will was created plus twenty-one years.  This time limit balances offsetting
economic factors (Ellickson, 1986).  On one hand, greater discretion on the part of testators gives
them an incentive to acquire wealth during their lifetime in anticipation of having the ability to
control it after their death.  Such controls are especially beneficial if immediate heirs are known
to be spendthrifts. On the other hand, the value of such restrictions fades in the future where later
heirs would benefit from the ability to respond to unforeseen events.  The time limit on a
testator’s control reflects this factor.71
6.   Involuntary Transfers of Property
This section examines involuntary transfers of property from one private party to another.
Initially, we discuss transfers that occur as a result of uncertainty about ownership or boundary
location, and hence, for the most part, are unintentional.  We conclude by discussing intentional
involuntary transfers, or theft.
6.1. Adverse Possession
Adverse possession is a curious doctrine that appears to legitimize the theft of land by squatters.
The doctrine establishes title in property to the current user or possessor without the consent of,
or compensation to, the original legal owner.72 In order to gain title the adverse possessor must
                                                          
71 There has been a debate over the efficiency of the rule against perpetuities.  Epstein (1986), for example, argues
that the rule constrains the wishes of current property owners and is thus inefficient.  Ellickson (1986), however,
argues that future transaction costs justify the rule and are likely to outweigh any inefficiencies in the current period.
See also Dukeminier and Krier (2002).
72 It therefore has little rational in the absence of transaction costs and is viewed typically as a method of clarifying
title that has become clouded over time. See Dukemineir and Krier (2002).
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"openly and notoriously" maintain exclusive possession for a statutorily specified term that
ranges from one to thirty years in the United States.  The precept of adverse possession is
embedded in the common law and can be traced to an English statute enacted in 1275.
Contemporary American law is a mixture of statutory and case law in which statutes define
required time periods and other specific conditions, while court decisions define "notorious"
possession and other less specific requirements.
Adverse possession is recognizable as a first possession doctrine.  The adverse possessor has
"relative title," by virtue of prior possession, or has "rights against the rest of the world from the
moment that he claims possession." (Epstein 1986, p. 675.)  Excluding the original owner, the
adverse possessor acquires relative title through first possession.  Moreover, in a successful
adverse possession action the original owner's title is deemed to be invalid.  Consequently, first
possession becomes an accurate description of the process by which ownership is established.
The law essentially treats the property as abandoned by the original owner.  Historical adverse
possession cases have dealt with such issues as abandoned farmland, cabins in the woods, and
old mining sites.  Typical cases today deal with title to real estate in situations where property
boundaries are either unknown or misunderstood.  For example, a homeowner builds an addition
that, it turns out, is actually on the neighbor's legal property.  Under adverse possession the
homeowner gains title to the property in question by virtue of his possession through building the
addition.  In the historical cases, heterogeneity probably served to mitigate dissipation from first
possession, and there is little evidence of racing among potential adverse possessors.  In the
modern real estate boundary cases, heterogeneity is at its extreme.  There is only one potential
claimant; hence, there is no dissipation.
Economists have formulated several theories to explain the details of adverse possession
doctrine, treating it as a time-limited property right.73  Perhaps the most compelling one is based
on the presence of offsetting risks to ownership of land.  The first risk arises from the possibility,
discussed in Section 5, of past claims by previous owners who were deprived of their title
through fraud or error.  A time limit on such claims limits this risk to current owners.
Specifically, let p(t) be the risk of such a claim, where t is the duration of the prior owner’s
property right.  We assume that p′(t)>0, reflecting a higher risk for longer-lasting property rights,
and p(0)=0.74  The other risk is that the current owner may himself be displaced by a squatter.
This possibility can be reduced, however, by periodic monitoring of the property to eject
squatters or correct boundary errors (Ellickson, 1986).  A longer time limit on the owner’s
property right lowers this cost by reducing the required frequency of monitoring.  Formally, let
m(t) be the cost of monitoring that the owner must spend to retain title with certainty, where
m′<0 and m(∞)=0.
Now suppose the current owner contemplates investing in the land.  Let V(x) be the market value
of an investment of x dollars, where V′>0 and V″<0.  Given this uncertainty, the owner will
choose x to maximize the expected value, (1-p(t))[V(x)−m(t)]−x, taking t as given.  This yields
the first-order condition
                                                                                                                                                                                          
73 See, for example, Ellickson (1986), Merrill (1985a), and Miceli and Sirmans (1995b).
74 Note that land registration under the Torrens system effectively sets t=0 by extinguishing most past claims.
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(1−p(t))V′(x) − 1 = 0. (6.1)
Condition (6.1) defines the optimal investment, x*(t), as a function of the time limit, where
∂x*/∂t=p′V′/(1-p)V″<0.  Thus, increasing the duration of property rights actually reduces
investment incentives by increasing the risk of a past claim.
Given this characterization of the landowner’s problem, we can derive the optimal duration of
property rights as the value of t that maximizes the total value of the land net of monitoring
costs:75
V(x*(t)) − x*(t) −  m(t). (6.2)
Differentiating (6.2) and substituting from (6.1) yields
p(t)V′(x)(∂x*/∂t) = m′(t). (6.3)
Thus, the optimal time limit balances the detrimental effect of longer t on investment incentives
(the left-hand side) against the savings in monitoring costs (the right-hand side).
Although all fifty states have adverse possession statutes, as noted, the length of the statutory
period varies, ranging from one to thirty years with mean length of 13.63 years.76  Two empirical
studies of adverse possessions statutes show that this cross-state variation is broadly explained
by the economic model (Netter, et al., 1986; Baker, et al., 2001).
6.2. The Mistaken Improver Problem
The analysis to this point has treated the probability of a claim as a function only of the statutory
period, but owners can lower the risk of a claim by surveying the property prior to development
to detect boundary errors, or by searching the land records (as discussed in Section 5) to uncover
disputed title. Suppose that a survey reveals ownership with certainty.  If the developer is the
owner, he can proceed with development as if there is no risk of a loss,77 whereas if someone
else is the owner, he can purchase the land if it is more valuable in a developed state.  In this
way, the value of the land is maximized.  Determining ownership is costly, however, which may
make it more profitable for the developer to proceed without a survey.  This raises the possibility
of mistaken improvement of another’s property—the so-called mistaken improver problem.
 To examine this problem formally, let V be the market value of the improved land, and let p be
the probability that the land is owned by someone else who values it in its unimproved state at R.
Further, suppose R is unobservable to the developer but is known to vary according to the
distribution function F(R).  If the developer surveys at cost s prior to developing, the expected
value of the land is (1−p)V+pEmax[V,R]−s, or
                                                          
75 We assume that whoever ends up as owner will spend m(t).
76 The data are from Leiter (1999).  In some states, the length is conditional on whether the squatter has “color of
title” (i.e., evidence that appears to, but does not legally, convey title).
77 In that case, he will invest an amount x*>x*(t) for any t>0.
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(1−p)V + p[F(V)V+ ∫∞
V
RRdF )( ]− s. (6.4)
Equation (6.4) shows this value comes in three parts: the value if developed, the value if not
developed, and survey costs.  If, however, the developer proceeds without a survey, the value of
the land is fixed at V, regardless of who turns out to be the owner.  A survey is optimal if (6.4)
exceeds V, or if
p ∫∞ −
V
RdFVR )()(  > s. (6.5)
The left-hand side of this condition is the expected benefit of avoiding irreversible improvement
of the land when it is owned by someone else who values it more highly in its unimproved state.
Developers will not necessarily make the first-best survey decision on their own, however,
because they will ignore the opportunity cost of development when someone else is the owner.
The law, however, provides victims of mistaken improvement remedies that potentially create
the right incentives.  The law of mistaken improvement dates back at least to Roman times,
where the law of accession stated that materials affixed to land became the property of the
owner.  The mistaken improver could at most seek compensation for the value of the
improvements.  The modern law in most states is dictated by so-called betterment acts, which
typically allow landowners the option of either paying for the improvements (according to the
old rule), or forcing the improver to buy the land at its unimproved value (Dickinson, 1985).  It
turns out that this “option” remedy induces would-be improvers to internalize the opportunity
cost of the improvements in the face of ownership uncertainty and hence gives them exactly the
right incentives to conduct a survey (Miceli and Sirmans, 1999).
6.3. Partition of Real Estate
Another form of involuntary transfer, this time involving joint owners of property, is the right to
partition real estate.  Under the common law, each co-owner of a parcel of land has the right to
force a physical partition of the property (partition in kind) into separately owned parcels. While
this solution overcomes transaction costs among co-owners (due, for example, to the anti-
commons problem (Heller, 1998)), it may result in excessive fragmentation if there are scale
economies associated with the best use of the land.  State partition statutes have sought to
address this problem by providing courts with an alternative to in-kind partition--namely, forced
sale of the undivided parcel with division of the proceeds to the co-owners in proportion to their
ownership shares.
The problem with forced sales, however, is that non-consenting owners only receive the market
value of their shares, thus depriving them of any subjective value that they may attach to the
land.  (In effect, forced sale substitutes liability rule protection of owners’ shares for property
rule protection, thus creating the possibility of an inefficient sale (Calabresi and Melamed,
1972).)  In terms of efficiency, forced sale will only be preferred to partition in kind if the
preserved scale economies exceed the foregone subjective value of all non-consenting owners
(Miceli and Sirmans, 2000).  Courts seem sensitive to this trade-off.  In particular, they tend to
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favor partition in kind (property rule protection), unless the resulting fragmentation would
materially reduce the aggregate value of the land.78  This standard offers courts a margin for
protecting subjective value of non-consenting owners against expropriation.
6.4. Theft
The most obvious form of involuntary transfer of property is theft, which is classified as a crime.
This presents the following paradox--if a thief values the stolen property more than the owner
does, then the transfer is efficient (though coercive).  Thus, why not simply force the thief to pay
a fine equal to the value of the stolen property, in effect, treating the theft as a tort?  One
objection is that the thief will sometimes avoid detection, thus lowering his expected cost and
allowing some inefficient transfers, but this problem could be addressed by simply inflating the
fine in proportion to the inverse of the probability of detection.79
A more fundamental objection to the “efficient theft” argument is that it permits individuals to
violate the general transaction structure by converting property rules into liability rules; that is, to
substitute coercive transfers for market transfers (Calabresi and Melamed, 1972; Kelvorick,
1985; Coleman, 1988). Market transfers are more efficient than coercive ones in low transaction
cost settings, first, because courts may err in setting the right amount of compensation (the
standard problem with liability rules), and second, because owners will devote excessive
resources to the protection of their property (a from of rent seeking).
If the preceding argument makes sense for tangible property, it is all the more persuasive when
the violation concerns one’s bodily integrity or civil rights.  The law therefore seeks to deter such
violations by setting the penalty above compensatory damages (possibly including the risk of
imprisonment) and labeling them as crimes (illegitimate transfers).
7.   Land Use Conflicts: Externalities and Property
Externalities arise when one party uses his property in a way that imposes a cost (or confers a
benefit) on another party without first obtaining that party’s consent.  In this sense, externalities
are a form of involuntary transfer. When assets are complex and transaction costs are positive,
externalities are ubiquitous. This is because property rights to at least some of the attributes of an
asset will be imperfect and thus contain problems of open access or moral hazard.  In the case of
land, externalities are important since any parcel (except an island or continent) will have
neighboring owners, but they also arise in the context of air quality, noise, and water, where
property rights are especially hard to define and enforce.
In this section, we analyze various remedies for externalities (primarily harmful externalities),80
focusing specifically on a comparison of the standard tax-subsidy approach most commonly
associated with Pigou, with the property rights, or Coasian, approach.81 We also discuss the
common law remedies of trespass and nuisance, as well as public controls like zoning.
                                                          
78 See, e.g., Trowbridge v. Donner, 40 N.W.2d 655 (1950).
79 This is the economic rationale for punitive damages in torts (Polinsky and Shavell, 1998).
80 Public goods, discussed in the next section, are examples of beneficial externalities.
81 The analysis is based on Polinsky (1979) and White and Wittman (1979).
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7.1. A Model of Externalities in the Short and Long Run
This section develops a simple model of external costs that we will use to examine the various
remedies.  The model considers both short and long run notions of efficiency in anticipation of
the fact that some remedies that are efficient in the short run are inefficient in the long run. To be
specific, consider, as did Coase (1960), a railroad whose trains emit sparks that occasionally set
fire to crops on farmland adjacent to the tracks.  Suppose that the number of trains being run is nT
and the number of farms (total acreage) is nF, resulting in crop damage equal to nTnFD(x,y),
where D is the damage (in terms of reduced crop value per acre) each train causes, x is dollar
spending on precaution per train by the railroad (e.g., whether to install a spark arrester), and y is
dollar spending on precaution by each farmer (e.g., where to locate the crops).82  We assume that
Dx<0, Dy<0, Dxx>0, and Dyy>0, reflecting diminishing marginal benefits to precaution.  The
benefits of railroading and farming are captured by bT(nT) and bF(nF), which are the marginal
benefit functions for the two activities, respectively, both of which are assumed to display
diminishing marginal benefits (i.e., bj′<0, j=T,F).  The total value of the land in this model is
given by
W = ∫ ∫+T F
n n
FT dzzbduub
0 0
)()( − [nTnFD(x,y) + nTx + nFy] (7.1)
In the short run, the numbers of trains and farms are fixed.  Thus, short run efficiency only
concerns the expenditures on precaution (x,y) that maximize (7.1) and are given by
nFDx(x*,y*) + 1 ≡ 0 (7.2)
nTDy (x*,y*)+ 1 ≡ 0. (7.3)
These conditions state that the parties should invest in precaution up to the point where marginal
benefits in terms of saved damages equal marginal costs.  In the long run all assets become
choice variables so the number of trains and farms (nT , nF) must also be chosen to maximize
(7.1).  The resulting first-order conditions for nT and nF are
bT(nT) − [nFD(x,y) + x] ≡ 0 (7.4)
bF(nF) − [nTD(x,y) + y] ≡ 0, (7.5)
which state that each activity should be increased to the point where the last unit (train or farm)
yields zero profit.
7.2. The Pigovian Tax-Subsidy Approach 
                                                          
82 This formulation of expected damages assumes constant returns to scale in number of trains and farms.  See
Shavell (1980) for a similar model in the context of tort law.
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The traditional (pre-Coase) approach to the control of externalities is the Pigovian, or tax-subsidy
approach.  The idea is that the government needs to impose a tax on, or pay a subsidy to, the
source of the externality (the railroad in this case) in order to force it to internalize the damage
that it causes.  Consider first short run incentives regarding precaution, holding the number of
trains and farms fixed. Under a tax, the railroad pays the government based on damages imposed.
Both the railroad and farmer will choose efficient care under this remedy provided that, first, the
marginal tax equals the marginal damages imposed on farmers (from (7.2), t′(x)=nFDx), and
second, that farmers do not receive the revenue from the tax (except possibly as a lump sum
payment). Symmetrically, a subsidy scheme under which the government pays the railroad to
reduce crop damage achieves bilateral efficiency in the short run provided that the marginal
reduction in the subsidy equals marginal damages (i.e., −s′(x)=nFDx).
Note that the structures of the tax-subsidy schedules are not fully determined by these conditions.
This is not the case, however, when we take into account long run efficiency.  Consider first the
railroad’s decision about the number of trains. According to condition (7.4), the railroad will
only choose the efficient number if it internalizes the full cost of the crop damage per train.  This
requires that it pay a tax per train equal to nFD(x,y).  (Note that this tax satisfies the marginal
condition above.)  Clearly, a subsidy that involves any payments to the railroad will therefore
result in too many trains.   As for farming, condition (7.5) says that efficient entry of farmers
requires that each farmer internalize the crop damage that his entry contributes to total damages.
This condition is satisfied as long as farmers do not expect to receive any compensation for their
losses (including lump sum compensation).  In combination, these results show that only a tax
scheme can achieve bilateral efficiency in both the short and long run.
7.3. The Property Rule-Liability Rule Approach
As discussed above, one of the contributions of Coase (1960) was to challenge the Pigovian
assumption that externalities necessarily lead to market failure.  This recognition suggests an
expanded set of remedies for controlling externalities, which is best exemplified by the choice
between property rules and liability rules (Calabresi and Melamed, 1972).83 Under property
rules, right holders can refuse any unwanted infringements of their rights, enforceable by
injunctions (or criminal sanctions in the case of theft).  Property rules thus form the legal basis
for voluntary (market) exchange of rights.  In contrast, liability rules do not entitle right holders
to refuse infringements of their rights; instead, they can only seek monetary compensation in the
form of damages.  Liability rules thus form the basis for court-ordered or non-consensual
transactions.84
From an economic perspective, the choice between property rules and liability rules therefore
turns on the relative efficiency of markets versus courts (or some other third party arbiter) for
allocating resources.  When transaction costs are relatively low and markets function well,
                                                          
83 Also see Polinsky (1980a) and Kaplow and Shavell (1996) for more recent analyses of property rules versus
liability rules.
84 Calabresi and Melamed (1972) also discuss a third rule, an inalienability rule, which prevents transfer of right
under any circumstances (including consensual transfers).  This rule is used to protect rights like freedom of religion
and speech, the right to vote, and so on, that are deemed fundamental (“inalienable”).  We do not pursue economic
(or other) justifications for inalienability rules here.
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property rules are preferred because they ensure that all transactions are mutually beneficial.85
When transaction costs are high, however, the costs of reaching an agreement under property
rules may prevent otherwise efficient transactions from occurring.  Liability rules have an
advantage in this case because they allow the court to force a transfer.  In this way, a court-
ordered transaction replaces a market transaction.  (The advantage of liability rules in
economizing on transaction costs, however, needs to be weighed against court administrative
costs and the possibility of court error in setting damages, which may result in too many or too
few transactions, plus litigation costs.)   Property rules thus form the basis for settling property
disputes when transaction costs are relatively low, while liability rules form the basis when they
are not.
In the context of the railroad-farmer conflict, a liability rule entitles farmers (victims) to seek
monetary compensation for their damages but not to stop the damage from occurring.86  If
liability is strict, the railroad (injurer) must pay full compensation regardless of its level of
precaution.  In terms of short run efficiency, strict liability induces efficient precaution by the
railroad, but because farmers are fully compensated, they have no incentive to take precaution.
(The outcome is identical to a tax scheme where the revenue is paid to victims as compensation.)
In contrast, a negligence rule, which only holds the railroad liable for damages if it takes less
than the efficient level of abatement as defined by (7.2) (for example, if it fails to install spark
arresters), will induce both parties to take efficient care.  The railroad will take care to avoid
liability, and the farmers will take care to minimize their losses.87
Neither liability rule, however, will achieve long run efficiency.  Under strict liability, too many
farmers will enter because they do not consider the impact that their entry has on total damages.
Although the railroad does face full liability for each train that it runs, equal to nFD(x,y), this
amount is too large because of the excessive number of farms.  Thus, too few trains will run
(though the number of trains is efficient, given the number of farms).  The situation is reversed
under a negligence rule. The railroad will invest in optimal abatement to avoid liability, but as a
result, it will run too many trains (Polinsky, 1980b).  In contrast, farmers will face the full
amount of their damages, nTD(x,y), but too few farmers will enter because the number of trains is
too large.  In general, liability rules cannot create efficient long run incentives because of the
constraint that what one party pays the other must receive.88
If the farmers’ rights are protected by a property rule, they can block the railroad from running
any trains by means of an injunction.  The railroad, however, can seek to purchase rights to
impose crop damage.  For each train that it runs, the railroad will invest in abatement up to the
point where the last dollar spent just equals aggregate marginal damages to all farmers, after
which it will prefer to compensate farmers for the residual damages.  Then, given efficient
abatement per train, the railroad will run trains up to the point where the aggregate amount it has
                                                          
85 Kaplow and Shavell (1996) argue that when transaction costs are zero, property rules and liability rules should be
equally efficient.  However, because liability rules require courts to establish the initial terms of a transaction by
setting damages (which the parties may later adjust), the administrative costs of using this rule may be higher than
using a property rule.
86 Note that the Coasian tradition would not use victim given the ‘reciprocal nature’ of the externality problem.
87 See Chapter xx for a fuller discussion of the various negligence rules.
88 This reflects the compensatory function of tort law.
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to compensate farmers equals the marginal benefit of one more train.  This results in the first-
best number of trains.
Efficient precaution by farmers can similarly be achieved by contracting.  This requires that the
railroad compensate farmers for their costs of precaution up to the point where the last dollar
spent on precaution equals the marginal reduction in aggregate damages owed. Achieving the
efficient number of farms is much more problematic.  According to condition (7.5), long run
efficiency requires that farmers enter up to the point where the marginal benefits of the last farm
equal its marginal contribution to crop damage plus cost of precaution.  But since farmers are
compensated for these costs under the current assignment of rights, there exists be an incentive
for too many to enter.  In theory, private contracting can prevent excessive entry, but only if the
railroad can identify all potential entrants into farming and offer to pay them their marginal
benefit of entry if they agree to stay out. Clearly this poses a significant informational demand on
the railroad.  (Of course, a similar problem faces farmers if the property right is initially assigned
to the railroad.)  This discussion illustrates the limited usefulness of private contracting in
internalizing externalities, especially regarding long run efficiency (Frech, 1979; Wittman, 1984;
Holderness, 1989).
7.4. The Law of Trespass and Nuisance
As we noted above, in the case of real property, externalities arise because of conflicting uses of
adjacent parcels.  The primary common law remedies for unwanted invasions are trespass and
nuisance.  The law distinguishes the two by defining trespass as an invasion that deprives the
owner of exclusive possession of land, and nuisance as an interference with the use and
enjoyment of land. Examples of trespass are squatters and boundary encroachment, while
examples of nuisance are air, water, and noise pollution.
The primary remedy under trespass is an injunction against the unwanted intrusion.  Thus, the
landowner’s right to exclude is protected by a property rule.  The remedy under nuisance law is
more complicated. First, the landowner can only obtain relief if the invasion is substantial, and
even then, he may have to be satisfied with money damages (a liability rule).  If the landowner
wishes the harm to be enjoined, he must meet the further legal standard of showing that the harm
outweighs the benefit of the nuisance-creating activity (Keeton, et al., 1984, p. 630).
Merrill (1985a, 1998) argues that this distinction between trespass and nuisance can be broadly
understood in terms of the choice between property rules and liability rules.  Cases of trespass
ordinarily involve a small number of parties where the intruder is easily identifiable.  Thus,
transaction costs tend to be low, and property rules are the preferred remedy.  In contrast, cases
of nuisance often involve large numbers or sources of harm that are difficult to identify.  Thus,
transaction costs are high and contracting is unlikely to lead to the efficient outcome. In cases
like this liability rules are preferred.
The well-known case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. provides an illustration of this choice.89
The case involved a group of landowners who sought an injunction against a large cement
factory because of the dirt, smoke, and noise that it produced.  The court denied the injunction
                                                          
89 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 N.E.2d 870 (Court of Appeals of New York, 1970.
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and instead awarded money damages on the grounds that the injunction would have forced the
factory to shut down, causing a loss of jobs and the company’s substantial capital investment.
The court’s decision seems correct in view of the high transaction costs (owing to the large
number of effected homeowners) that would have been necessary to keep the plant operating
under an injunction.
7.5. Zoning, Covenants, and Common Law Control
Probably the most common legal response to land market externalities in the United States is
zoning, a form of public regulation.90  The economic rationale for zoning is that “similar land
uses have no (or only small) external effects on each other whereas dissimilar land uses may
have large effects” (White, 1975, p. 32).  The widespread use of zoning, however, does not
necessarily make it the most efficient response to externalities.  High administrative and
enforcement costs often exceed the saved “nuisance costs,” thereby making the system
inefficient (Ellickson, 1973).  This would not be a problem, however, if the penalty for violations
were payment of an appropriate fine, which would allow landowners to circumvent inefficient
regulations.  In this sense, zoning regulations are best enforced by a liability rule (White and
Wittman, 1979).  The fact that compliance with zoning ordinances is required, however, (that is,
they are enforced by a property rule) forecloses this route to efficiency.
A private alternative to zoning is the use of land use servitudes (e.g., covenants, easements, or
equitable servitudes) that impose limits on what landowners can do with their property. Such
restrictions are usually put in place by developers when they first sub-divide a parcel of land in
recognition of the fact that, once divided, individual landowners will often undertake activities
that impose externalities on one another (Hughes and Turnbull 1996).  By attaching the
restriction up front, the developer maximizes the aggregate value of the development (and hence
his profit) by internalizing the neighborhood externalities.  Further, since the restrictions are
attached to the deed rather than to the landowner (that is, they “run with the land”), they avoid
the transaction costs that would be necessary if each new resident had to negotiate anew with all
existing residents.  In this sense, land use servitudes represent an effective private alternative to
zoning for small-scale developments. They are less effective, however, in controlling
externalities in large-scale urban areas where development occurs in a piecemeal fashion over
time.
Trespass and nuisance law also represent private alternatives to zoning.  As noted above, trespass
is effective in internalizing small-scale intrusions (for example, boundary disputes between
neighbors), while nuisance law is best suited to harms that affect a few individuals (Ellickson,
1973).  However, nuisance law is inadequate to internalize harms that are dispersed across a
large number of landowners because no one owner has an adequate incentive to incur the cost of
bringing a nuisance suit, even though the aggregate harm may exceed the benefit (Landes and
Posner, 1987, Chapter 2).  For these types of externalities, public regulation, whereby the
government acts as an agent of the victims, is usually the best remedy.
                                                          
90 Zoning was declared constitutional in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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8. State Property and State Use of Private Property
In section 2 we noted that state or government ownership was one of the primary types of
property rights.   Here we examine the rationale for state ownership and for state control of
private property.
8.1. The Optimal Scale of Ownership
Private ownership of land is not always the most efficient means of maximizing land value. The
primary advantage of private ownership is that it creates the proper incentives for use and
investment for actions taken within the boundaries of the property. Since different uses of land
have different optimal boundary requirements, it may be the case that the scale of an activity
exceeds the existing boundaries of ownership (Ellickson, 1993).  For example, Coase’s example
of straying cattle suggests that the rancher’s parcel was too small.  One solution to this problem
is contracting between ranchers and neighboring owners who suffer harm (Ellickson, 1991), but
if contracting costs are high, a better solution may be to consolidate ownership of the parcels
(Libecap 1989).  In this way, market transactions are replaced by internal governance methods
(Ostrom, 1990).  The optimal solution depends on the cost of contracting among landowners
(which increases with greater decentralization) compared to the cost of governance (which
increases with scale).91   In an empirical application Lueck (1989) examines the ownership
regimes that govern wildlife a resource that often has an optimal scale of management that far
exceeds the typical boundaries of private land holdings.  Lueck finds a mix of private contracting
and government ownership regimes that have developed in response to the potential externality
problems.
Another benefit of group ownership, besides internalizing externalities, is risk sharing. Group
ownership of land spreads the risk of uncertain events like crop failure, thereby providing a form
of insurance.  Group ownership also promotes egalitarianism, or equal sharing of output, which
historically has been the motivation for various communal societies (Ellickson, 1993; Cosgel,
Miceli, and Murray, 1997).  As noted in the discussion of common property, these benefits must
be weighed against the cost of group ownership in the form of diluted incentives for effort.
8.2. The Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine is an ancient doctrine which grants ownership of navigable rivers,
shorelines, and the open sea to the public.92  The public trust doctrine can be viewed as the
judicial creation of common property, which has roots in Roman law and the English common
law.  English and Roman public trust law both acknowledged inalienable public rights in
navigable waterways and the foreshore.  They allowed, for example, unrestricted access to large
watercourses for travel and transportation.  The public trust doctrine also has been a part of
American law, providing public access to navigable waterways and authorizing state control over
tidelands.93  In essence, the public trust doctrine "defines an easement that members of the public
hold in common" (Huffman, 1989, p. 527), thus creating a sort of common property resource
                                                          
91 The problem is analogous to Coase’s (1937) theory of the optimal boundary between the market and the firm.
92 For an introduction see Dukeminier and Krier (2002, pp.816-823).
93  The seminal case is Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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among a disorganized public.  In recent years some courts have extended the doctrine into new
areas -- mostly environmental assets -- such as beaches, lakes, stream access, and wildlife (Sax
1970).    For example, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,94 perhaps the most important
modern case, extended public trust status to wildlife habitat at California's Mono Lake, thereby
effectively reallocating water rights.
In its traditional application, navigable waters, the public trust asset was essentially a public
good.  When an asset is a public good, unrestricted access will not cause dissipation from
overuse of the resource.  On the other hand, when the resource has private good characteristics,
unrestricted access by a large number of people trigger the rule of capture and creates a classic
open access problem.  Indeed, some critics (Cohen 1992, Huffman 1989) of new environmental
applications of the public trust doctrine argue that expanding access to resources will lead to
their degradation through overuse.95  For instance, a public trust conversion of a private beach
into a public beach may well lead to crowding and pollution of the beach.
8.3. Land Assembly and the Holdout Problem
Large-scale economic developments like railroads, highways, and shopping centers often involve
the assembly of land.  In all of these cases, the provider, whether public or private, faces a
potential holdout problem (Cohen, 1991; Strange, 1995).  The source of this problem is that,
once assembly becomes public knowledge, each landowner realizes that he or she can impose a
substantial cost on the provider by refusing to sell.  This knowledge confers monopoly power on
owners, who can each hold out for prices in excess of their true valuations, thereby endangering
completion of the project.96
One solution to the land assembly problem is to allow forced sales—that is, replace property rule
protection of each owner’s land with liability rule protection.  This is the economic justification
for the eminent domain clause of the U.S. Constitution, which says, “nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation” (Posner, 2003, p. 55). Although eminent
domain is a power reserved for the government based on the “public use” requirement, the
preceding discussion suggests that it should be extended to any provider, public or private, facing
a holdout problem.
8.4. Public Use of Private Property
Merrill (1986) examines the scope of the takings power in the context of the public use
requirement.  He draws a distinction between the “means” and “ends” approach to public use.
The means approach concerns the manner in which land is acquired for large-scale projects (is
there a holdout problem?), while the ends approach refers to the use of the land (is it for a public
or private good?).  It is important to note that these are separable categories—that is, not all
                                                          
94  658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
95 Cohen (1992) and Rose (1986), note how an expansive public trust doctrine can be used by governments to avoid the
Constitution's takings clause.
96 It is important to distinguish this problem from the case of single owners of dispersed parcels who seek the best
price for their property in one-on-one transactions. This is not a holdout problem because the owners are not seeking
a price above the true valuation of their property, nor does any one owner’s refusal to sell affect the transfer of other
parcels.
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public goods require land assembly, and some private goods do.  According to the ends
approach, the takings power should be limited to provision of public goods by the government,
whereas according to the means approach, it should be granted to any provider facing a holdout
problem.97
The ends approach appears more consistent with the plain meaning of public use, but it
potentially results in two types of “errors.”  First, it may result in the use of eminent domain for
the provision of public goods not requiring land assembly (Fischel, 1995a, p. 74). Merrill argues,
however, that this overuse of the takings power (i.e., the substitution of coercive for consensual
transactions) is self-limiting in the sense that the costs of market acquisition are generally less
than the costs of eminent domain.  Second, the ends approach apparently denies use of eminent
domain to private providers facing a holdout problem. Historically, however, courts have tended
to act in accordance with the means approach by granting takings power to private parties like
railroad and canal builders who face serious holdout problems, though they nearly always
attempt to justify their action in terms of the ends approach--that is, they identify some public
benefit from the project (Merrill, 1986, p. 67).98  The need for such justification is somewhat
surprising, however, given that courts routinely use liability rules (i.e., money damages) as a
remedy in other disputes involving private parties.  For example, awarding damages to the
plaintiffs in the Boomer case rather than shutting the factory down amounted to a “private
taking” by the factory.  This was appropriate, we argued, because the factory faced a kind of
holdout problem.  The point is that the actual use of eminent domain appears to reflect economic
logic (the means approach), and when necessary, courts bend the meaning of public use to
conform to this standard (Fischel, 1995a, pp. 75-77).
8.5. State Takings and Just Compensation
In addition to public use, the eminent domain clause requires payment of just compensation
following a taking.99  Courts have interpreted this to mean “fair market value.”  Several authors
have argued, however, that fair market value almost certainly under compensates landowners
because it ignores subjective value (e.g., Knetsch and Borcherding, 1979).  Since subjective
value is part of the opportunity cost of a taking, failure to compensate for it potentially results in
over acquisition of land by the government.100  Countering this is Epstein’s (1985; Ch. 15)
contention that taxes used to finance compensation are themselves a form of taking, which act as
a limit on the amount of land taxpayers will permit the government to acquire (Fischel, 1995a, p.
211).
One of the primary contributions of the economics literature on eminent domain has been to
argue that it may be inefficient to pay any compensation.  This claim was first advanced by
                                                          
97 Ulen (1992) argues that eminent domain should only be used when both conditions are met.
98 See, for example, the famous case of Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304
N.W.2d 455 (1981).
99 Outside of the economics literature, the most influential article on the compensation question is by Michelman
(1967).  Fischel and Shapiro (1988) provide a useful interpretation of Michelman’s utilitarian standard in light of the
scholarship reviewed here
100 In an empirical study of land acquisition in Chicago, Munch (1979) found that compensation amounts differed
systematically from market value.  Specifically, owners of high valued properties were overcompensated, while
owners of low valued properties were under compensated.
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Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (BRS) (1984) in their analysis of the impact of compensation on
land use incentives.  Their argument can be illustrated by a simplified version of their model.
Consider a parcel of land worth V(x) if the landowner makes an irreversible investment x, where
V′ >0 and V″ <0. The land may also be valuable for public use, yielding a benefit of B(y), where
y is the fraction of the land taken.  Setting y=1 therefore represents a taking of the entire parcel.
Alternatively, y may be interpreted as the probability of a taking, or the fraction of the parcel’s
value that is extinguished by a regulation.  In any case, 0≤y≤1 and B′ >0, B″ <0.  If the land is
taken or regulated, suppose that compensation of C(x) will be paid in proportion to the fraction
taken or lost (i.e., yC(x) will be paid for an expected loss of a fraction y of the land’s value),
where C(x)≥0, and C′ ≥0.
The time sequence is that landowners choose x given the anticipated behavior of the government
and the compensation rule; then the government chooses y and pays C(x).  We will assume
various objective functions for the government below.  First, however, consider the first-best
choices (x*, y*) that must maximize B(y) + (1−y)V(x) − x.  The relevant first-order conditions are
(1−y*)V′(x*) − 1 ≡ 0 (8.1)
B′(y*) − V(x*) ≡ 0. (8.2)
Now consider the decisions separately made by each party.  In the first scenario, we view the
government’s taking decision as exogenous—that is, it is unaffected by the compensation rule.
This is the assumption BRS (1984) make in their basic model, and represents what Fischel and
Shapiro (1989) refer to as an “inexorable” government.  In this case, y is fixed (so condition (8.2)
is irrelevant), while the landowner chooses x to maximize (1−y)V(x) + yC(x) − x, which must
satisfy
(1−y)V′(xl) + yC′(xl) − 1 ≡ 0. (8.3)
Comparing this to (8.1) shows that C′=0 is necessary for the landowner to invest efficiently; that
is compensation must be lump sum to ensure that xl=x* (BRS, 1984).  Intuitively, any positive
relationship between x and the amount of compensation creates a moral hazard problem that
results in over-investment.  It immediately follows that no compensation (C(x)≡0 for all x) is
efficient, although any lump sum rule is consistent with efficiency.101
The case of zero compensation, however, has attracted the most attention because it is both
counterintuitive and controversial. The result does not hold up, however, under different
assumptions about the government’s behavior.  Suppose, for example, that the government
chooses y to maximize social welfare.  Such a government has been characterized as
“benevolent” (Hermalin, 1995) or “Pigovian” (Fischel and Shapiro, 1989). The optimal choice of
y in this case is given by the first-order condition in (8.2). Note that, because the government
chooses y after the landowner’s investment of x is in place, (8.2) defines a function yg(x), where
                                                          
101 This is an example of the paradox of compensation (e.g., Cooter and Ulen 1999, p.169) which is also found in
tort law and contract law remedies (Cooter 1985).  It can be avoided with a contract or compensation mechanism
that defines optimal choices for both parties.
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The amount of land taken is decreasing in x because the more the landowner has invested, the
higher is the opportunity cost of a taking.
The landowner’s objective function is the same as above, but he now maximizes it subject to the
anticipated behavior of the government as described in (8.4).  The first-order condition is
(1−y)V′(x) + yC′(x) − [V(x)−C(x)](∂yg/∂x)  − 1 = 0. (8.5)
Note that compensation must again be lump sum, but zero compensation is no longer consistent
with efficiency.  This is reflected by the third term in (8.5), which implies that the landowner will
over-invest if C(x)<V(x) and under-invest if C(x)>V(x).  Intuitively, if the landowner expects to
be under compensated in the event of a taking, he will increase his investment in order to lower
the probability of a taking.  Conversely, if he expects to be overcompensated, he will under-
invest in order to raise the probability of a taking (Miceli, 1991; Hermalin, 1995).
This version of the model embodies two potential sources of moral hazard for the landowner.
The first is the threat of overinvestment if compensation is an increasing function of x (the basis
for the no-compensation result above), and the second is the effect of x on the government’s
taking decision.  One compensation rule that resolves both problems and induces an efficient
level of investment is C=V(x*).102  That is, compensation should be set at the full value of the
land, evaluated at the efficient level of investment.
It is important to emphasize that the justification for compensation in this model is not to prevent
excessive acquisition of land by the government, as is often argued. Suppose, however, that the
government is not benevolent, but instead acts on behalf of the majority (those who receive the
benefits of the taking) while ignoring the costs to individual property owners, except to the
extent that it must pay them compensation (Fischel and Shapiro, 1989; Hermalin, 1995; Nosal,
2001).  Such a government is said to have “fiscal illusion” in that only dollar costs enter its cost-
benefit calculation (BRS, 1984).
In this case, the government chooses y to maximize B(y) − yC(x), which yields the first-order
condition
B′(y) − C(x) ≡ 0. (8.6)
As before, this defines a function )(ˆ xy  whose characteristics depend on the nature of the
compensation rule.  The landowner now maximizes his objective function subject to )(ˆ xy , which
yields the first-order condition in (8.5) with ∂yg/∂x replaced by xy ∂∂ /ˆ .  Clearly, C=V(x*) will
                                                          
102 This rule is not the only one that achieves the efficient outcome.  One alternative will be discussed below, and
Hermalin (1995) proposes others.
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induce efficient investment by the landowner in this case based on the same reasoning above.
Moreover, setting C=V(x*) in (8.6) also yields the efficient taking decision by the government.103
Now consider an alternative compensation rule that also induces efficient behavior by both the
landowner and government in this model:
0, if  y ≤ y*
C =  (8.7)
V(x*), if  y > y*.
Note that this rule is conditional on the behavior of the government in that it pays full (lump-
sum) compensation if it over-regulates, but pays nothing otherwise (Miceli and Segerson, 1994,
1996).  In this sense, it is like a negligence rule in tort law.  As we will see, it also resembles
actual legal practice.
To verify the efficiency of (8.7), consider first the government’s choice of y.  Its problem is to
maximize
B(y),    if  y ≤ y*
(8.8)
B(y) − yV(x*),    if  y > y*.
Note first that it will never choose y<y* given B′>0.  Further, B(y*) > B(y*)−y*V(x*) ≥
*)()(max
*
xyVyB
yy
−
>
. Thus, the government chooses y*, in which case C=0.  The landowner
therefore views compensation as lump-sum and y as fixed at y*.  Thus, he chooses x*.
One advantage of the rule in (8.7) over the unconditional compensation rule C=V(x*) is that the
conditional rule will result in fewer takings claims (and hence lower administrative costs)
because landowners only expect to be compensated if the government acts inefficiently.104
Another advantage, noted above, is that the rule in (7.7) is more descriptive of actual takings law
in cases involving government regulations (so-called regulatory takings), which constitute the
vast majority of claims.105  For example, it closely resembles the “diminution of value” and
“nuisance exception” tests for compensation, both of which are conditional rules that limit
compensation to cases of excessive regulatory action.106
                                                          
103 Alternatively, Fischel and Shapiro (1989) consider a compensation rule of the form C=sV(x) where s is the
fraction of the value of the land that the government will pay in the event of a taking.  They argue that this is an
easier rule to administer compared to C=V(x*) because it does not require the government to calculate x*.  The
shortcoming is that the optimal value of s, which is strictly between zero and one, only achieves a second-best
outcome.
104 An offsetting benefit of unconditional compensation is that it provides landowners insurance against takings risk,
given that such insurance would be difficult to obtain in the market.  See Blume and Rubinfeld (1984) and Kaplow
(1986).
105 Compensation is always paid for physical invasions or outright takings.
106 The diminution of value test was first articulated in the famous case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (260
U.S. 393, 1922), and the nuisance exception was proposed in the more recent case of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council (112 S.Ct. 2886, 1992).  For a more detailed discussion of the rule in (8.7) in relation to takings
law, see Miceli and Segerson (1996).  Also see Fischel (1995a).
Lueck & Miceli – Property Law
47
8.6. Compensation and the Timing of Development
It is clear from the above discussion that regulations often redefine property rights to the
disadvantage of landowners.  Faced with the threat of no compensation for alterations of their
property rights, landowners can often reclaim these rights because they have private information
and a first mover advantage over regulatory agencies and legislatures.  In the process, they can
preempt regulations and may do so in ways that counter the intended goals of the regulations.
Land preservation and environmental regulations are perhaps the classic case (Cohen 1999, Dana
1995). While regulators consider restrictions to preserve land, developers race to beat the
regulations, often leading to more rapid development than would have otherwise occurred.
The incentive to preemptively develop can be seen in a two-period model of a landowner and a
regulatory agency which can invoke a land use regulation that will lower the value of the land by
preserving some environmental amenity (e.g., endangered species habitat, open space).107  The
land’s value under the regulation depends on the landowner’s behavior. Specifically, the
landowner can choose to maintain (m) or destroy (d) the amenity in period 1.  The landowner has
private information about the amenity and has a clear first mover advantage over the agency
because of this information and because of his ownership incentives.   Development and thus
destroying the amenity has a one-time cost (CD) and generates benefits (BD) from development.
CD is the cost of developing early; for example, harvesting timber before it has reached the
optimal harvest age.  If the amenity is destroyed the probability that the land will be regulated is
zero.   If the amenity is maintained there is a probability, γ ∈ (0,1), that the regulation will be
invoked because the agency will deem the amenity  worth preserving.   If the regulation is
invoked and no compensation is paid, the landowner loses all benefits from development in
period 2 (BD = 0 in period 2), but he may earn a smaller amount of benefits from an alternative
land use that does not harm the amenity (BA < BD).   If, however, the landowner waits until
period 2 to develop, he faces no costs of development (CD = 0).  In the absence of the regulation,
the optimal time to develop is in period 2.  The landowner takes as given market prices (which
determine the magnitudes of the various benefits and costs) and the probability the agency will
invoke the regulation.
 
 The landowner will maximize the expected value of the land by choosing to destroy the amenity
if the expected value of early development exceeds that of waiting, or if [BD-CD] > (1-γ)BD +
(γ)BA . This inequality leads to several straightforward comparative statics predictions. First,
increases in the probability that the land will be regulated (γ) will increase the probability of
preemptive development. Second, as the net value of development (BD-BA) increases, amenity
destruction is more likely.  Third, as the opportunity cost of early development increases (CD) it
is less likely that habitat destruction will occur.
Dana (1995) offers anecdotal evidence of such preemptive development and Lueck and Michael
(2003) find that the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) has led some forest landowners to
                                                          
107 The model here follows Lueck and Micheal’s (2003) application to the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA).
Miceli and Segerson (1996) present a similar model of development with irreversible investment that generates
premature development without compensation.   Innes, Polasky, and Tschirhart (1998) also examine the incentives
for landowners under the ESA.
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preemptively harvest timber in order to avoid costly land-use restrictions.  For example, they find
that landowners in North Carolina who are closer to populations of endangered red-cockaded
woodpeckers (and thus subject to potentially costly timber harvest restrictions) are more likely to
prematurely harvest their forest and choose shorter forest rotations.  In this setting the empirical
evidence indicates some endangered species habitat has been reduced on private land because of
the ESA’s land use regulations.  The extent of such counter-productive regulations is not widely
known and is a potentially important area of empirical research.
9. Conclusion
The economic analysis of property rights and the economic analysis of law were the twin
offspring of Coase’s (1960) seminal work.  Yet, today the economics of property law is a poor
cousin to the economics of contracts, torts, and many other areas.  In this chapter we have
surveyed the somewhat disjoint literature developed by economists and by legal scholars,
elaborated on some of the basic models, and highlighted areas where more work remains to be
done.
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TABLE 1: FIRST POSSESSION RULES
Asset Possession Rule Stock-Flow & Duration of Rights
Chattels (abandoned, lost, unclaimed) recover or show intent to recover stock – permanent
Intellectual property invent, write stock -- varies (17  - 100 years)
Land occupation & cultivation of land stock – permanent
Minerals (hard rock) locate mineral deposit stock – permanent
Ocean fisheries land fish flow -- current catch
Petroleum bring oil to surface flow -- current production
Water- appropriation doctrine develop a diversion plan stock – permanent
Water-- riparian doctrine pump or divert water flow -- current use
Wild game kill or capture animal flow -- current kill
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First Possession
Potential race to claim asset. Rule of capture
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Figure 1: Property Rights under the Rule of First Possession
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